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GROUNDWATER EXCEPTIONALISM: THE DISCONNECT
BETWEEN LAW AND SCIENCE
Christine A. Klein*
ABSTRACT
Most judges, legislators, and regulators would be hard-pressed to articulate
a comprehensive legal theory of groundwater. And yet, this under-appreciated,
over-used, life-sustaining resource plays an increasingly pivotal role in
prominent legal controversies. In defiance of hydrologic reality, lawmakers
have routinely singled out groundwater for unique treatment and decoupled it
from surface water. This Article dubs such phenomenon “groundwater
exceptionalism,” and identifies groundwater as an under-theorized aspect of
both property law and water law. It brings to light the numerous legal doctrines
infected by exceptionalism, including state water rights law, the federal reserved
rights doctrine, the apportionment of interstate waters, and the scope of
jurisdiction under the federal Clean Water Act. This Article constructs a
typology of the purported justifications for exceptionalism and identifies its two
key consequences: the over-propertization and under-regulation of
groundwater. It argues that these distortions must be corrected, not solely as a
normative matter, but also as essential reforms to bring the law into alignment
with science and promote analytical coherence, faithfulness to doctrinal
purpose, and sustainable water use. This Article concludes by culling the lessons
from over a century and identifying promising analytical tools to move the law
from exceptionalism toward integrity. More broadly, this analysis offers a
roadmap for integrating law and science in the context of resource management,
a challenge that will become increasingly critical in the face of climate change.

*
Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
I would like to thank participants in the Natural Resources Law Teachers Institute Works-in-Progress Workshop
(June 4, 2021) and the University of Florida Faculty Workshop (June 7, 2021) for generous and helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
[O]ne cannot separate ground water and surface water. What is
surface water at one time is ground water the next. What is ground
water today becomes surface water tomorrow. Any concept dealing
with all water must correlate ground water and surface water.
—Williams v. Wichita (1962)1

What is groundwater and why should the law care? As a textbook
explanation, hydrologists might define groundwater as “water found within the
pore spaces beneath the surface of the Earth” and regard it as “an integral part
of the hydrologic cycle.”2 But in the hands of judges and legislators, this simple
definition can become tortured beyond all hydrologic recognition. Worse,
lawyers have a knack for couching their extra-scientific views in technical
sounding jargon seemingly beyond reproach. And perhaps worst of all, the law
seems to delight in crafting fine distinctions between groundwater and surface
water in defiance of scientists’ understanding of the water cycle. In short,
groundwater is both a hydrologic category and legal construct, often with no
clear alignment of the two.

1
Williams v. Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 590 (Kan. 1962) (quoting Frank C. Foley, Water and the Laws of
Nature, 5 KAN. L. REV. 492, 497 (1957) (citing to a “scientific premise” implicit in challenged legislation and
upholding the constitutionality of 1945 legislation regulating both surface water and groundwater).
2
THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES 87 (2003); see also Aquifers, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC SOC’Y: RES. LIBR. https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/aquifers/ (last visited Dec.
16, 2021) (defining “groundwater” as “precipitation that has infiltrated the soil beyond the surface and collected
in empty spaces underground”). This Article will follow the hydrologic convention of writing “groundwater” as
a single word. In contrast, as one law professor quipped, “ground water” is “what you get when you put ice in a
blender.” John Leshy, Interstate Groundwater Resources: The Federal Role, 14 J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y, 1475,
1475 (2008) (retelling engineer’s joke).
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This Article uses the phrase “groundwater exceptionalism”3 to describe the
law’s often unique treatment of groundwater, unmoored from its role in the
hydrologic cycle. Why does it matter that the hydrologic and legal
understandings of groundwater diverge and that the law distinguishes surface
water from groundwater in numerous contexts? Certainly, it is the law’s
prerogative—and even mandate—to draw fine lines that have important legal
consequences. But what if the line-drawing exercise purports to rely on scientific
principles, when it in fact departs from them? And what if supporting rationales
are mere subterfuge to advance unacknowledged policy goals? In such cases,
this Article argues, reliance on pseudo-scientific distinctions between surface
water and groundwater skews legal policy and damages the integrity of the law.
This is not to say that legal outcomes or policy must necessarily be changed.
Instead, this Article argues that when courts and lawmakers except groundwater
from rules applicable to surface water, they should do so based on transparent,
coherent analysis. Such analysis should be ground-truthed for consistency with
hydrologic reality and faithful to the goals of the relevant legal doctrine.
This Article makes two contributions to the literature. First, it brings to light
the numerous and divergent legal doctrines that distinguish between surface
water and groundwater, showing that each such distinction is part of a broader
whole. Second, this Article tackles “groundwater” as an undertheorized legal
construct, locating it as a species of water, which itself is a subspecies of
property.
Part I sets the stage by exploring both hydrologic and legal understandings
of groundwater; it then considers the extent to which the notion of “American
exceptionalism” provides a useful analogy to furnish deeper insights into
groundwater exceptionalism. Next, Part II identifies legal doctrines that
incorporate the surface/groundwater divide, including (1) state water rights law;
(2) the federal reserved rights doctrine; (3) federal law governing the allocation
of interstate waters; and (4) the federal Clean Water Act. Constructing a
typology of exceptionalism across legal doctrines, the analysis unpacks each
doctrine’s rules, exceptions for groundwater, exclusionary rationales, and the
consequences of such groundwater privileging. Finally, Part III charts a path
forward, seeking to advance legal integrity through more coordinated and
coherent legal treatment of surface water and groundwater.

3
I first coined the phrase “groundwater exceptionalism” in Christine A. Klein, Owning Groundwater:
The Example of Mississippi v. Tennessee, 35 VA. ENV’T L.J. 474, 481–86 (2017).
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Overall, this analysis reveals that exceptionalism produces two key results:
the over-propertization and under-regulation of groundwater. As this Article will
argue, these distortions must be corrected, not primarily as a normative
preference, but as a matter of analytical coherence. At the outset, it is critical to
acknowledge that courts and lawmakers have made considerable progress
toward harmonizing the treatment of surface water and groundwater, but that
progress has been slow, inconsistent, and hindered by path dependence. Some
water doctrines date back to the mid-1800s, at least fifty years before science
firmly understood the hydrologic cycle and almost a century before widespread
groundwater use became technologically feasible.4 Early legal exceptions for
groundwater have remained surprisingly sticky, even after science knows they
are suspect. No sooner is an exception rejected in one doctrine than it reappears
in another. To firmly root out exceptionalism, this Article offers an interdoctrinal and historical perspective that surveys both the best and worst lines of
analysis from more than a century.
More broadly, this Article has profound implications for promoting
resilience in the face of climate change. It provides a case study of how the law
can impede the sustainable management of a critical resource—water—when it
is not data-driven and rooted in science. But more hopefully, this project’s
historical analysis shows how the integration of law and science can prompt even
a doctrine as tradition bound as water law to evolve into a powerful tool to
address the challenges of a changing climate.
I.

THE PUZZLE OF GROUNDWATER

Many disciplines face a tension between lumping and splitting:5 If the
subjects of study are lumped into an unwieldy whole, then important nuances go
undetected. But if the subjects are split into subcategories, then researchers must
ensure the categories are meaningful and do not generate counterproductive
complexity. The study of Earth’s water poses such analytical challenges. Both
hydrology and law recognize a split between surface water and groundwater.
But as discussed in this Part, these distinctions serve critically different
purposes. With little hyperbole, one could say that science segregates
groundwater to better understand its complexity, whereas the law does so as an
excuse to ignore that complexity.

4

See infra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Glenn Branch, Whence Lumpers and Splitters?, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC. (Dec. 2, 2014),
https://ncse.ngo/whence-lumpers-and-splitters (crediting naturalist Edward Newman (1801–1876) as likely the
first person to use lumpers and splitters in the same phrase).
5
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This Part examines these divergent hydrologic and legal understandings.
Section A presents a brief overview of groundwater from a scientific
perspective, observing that hydrologists isolate groundwater to better understand
its movement and its integral role in the planet’s water cycle. Section B then
turns to the law, which has long characterized groundwater as distinct from
surface water, employing hydrologic classifications unsupported by science.
Relying on these extra-scientific distinctions, the law has sometimes treated
groundwater as subject to ownership as part of the overlying surface estate and
has often deemed it too mysterious or difficult to understand, much less regulate.
Finally, section C explores the concept of “American exceptionalism” as an
analogy to offer insights into the notion of “groundwater exceptionalism”
developed in this Article.
A. Groundwater as Hydrologic Category
A critical portion of the water available for human use resides underground.
Only 2.5% of the water on Earth is non-saline freshwater; less than one-third of
that freshwater is in liquid form—not frozen in glaciers or in ice caps.6 Most of
that precious supply of fresh, unfrozen water resides underground in aquifers,7
which hydrogeologists define as “saturated soil or rock layer[s] with spaces that
allow water to move through [them].”8 Groundwater remained relatively
inaccessible for human use until the mid-twentieth century invention of the highspeed centrifugal pump in 1937 and subsequent technological innovations.9
These advances encouraged about a 240% surge in groundwater pumping in the
generation following World War II,10 a phenomenon styled the groundwater
revolution.11

6
Groundwater Storage and the Water Cycle, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://www.usgs.gov/specialtopic/water-science-school/science/groundwater-storage-and-water-cycle?qt-science_center_objects=0#qtscience_center_objects (last visited Dec. 16, 2021).
7
Id. (locating Earth’s freshwater in glaciers and ice caps (68.7%), groundwater (30.1%), and surface
water or elsewhere (1.2%)).
8
Groundwater and Aquifers, OR. ST. UNIV. (2021), https://wellwater.oregonstate.edu/groundwater/
understanding-groundwater/groundwater-and-aquifers.
9
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY, ROBERT H. ABRAMS & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, LEGAL
CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 447 (6th ed. 2018); John D. Leshy, Interstate
Groundwater Resources, supra note 2, at 1475; ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING
AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S FRESH WATERS 26 (2002).
10
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 9 (documenting an increase in groundwater extraction in the United
States “from about 34 billion gallons per day . . . in 1950 to a peak of 83 billion gallons per day . . . in 1980”).
11
See Burke W. Griggs, Interstate Water Litigation in the West: A Fifty-Year Retrospective, 20 WATER
L. REV. 153, 158 (2017) [hereinafter Griggs, A Fifty-Year Retrospective].
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Hydrologists, like lawyers, initially thought that groundwater was distinct
from surface water.12 But by at least the early twentieth century, scientists had
developed a firm understanding of the interconnectedness of all water through
the hydrologic cycle (also known as the “water cycle”).13 Scientists now know
that precipitation and surface streams replenish aquifers.14 Conversely, aquifers
can feed surface stream flow.15 This constant interaction between above- and
below-ground water creates the potential for conflict between water users who
rely on diversions from surface streams and those who rely on well withdrawals
from aquifers.16 In the Great Plains region, for example, groundwater users have
dried up an estimated 350 miles of surface streams since 1950, affecting farmers,
ranchers, and others who rely on those flows, as well as the natural
environment.17
Today, the critical issue for hydrologists is not whether water moves
continuously through the hydrologic cycle, but rather the speed and direction of
that movement, as affected by the characteristics of subsurface geologic
materials.18 For example, water can remain underground for periods ranging
from a few weeks to thousands of years—the so-called “residence time” in the
aquifer.19 Relatedly, there is wide variability in the rates at which surface water
and precipitation migrate downward into the aquifer—known as the “recharge
rate.”20 Although scientists now have a clear grasp of broad hydrogeologic
principles, it can remain difficult in particular cases to identify the complex

12
See CECH, supra note 2, at 89 (asserting “the ancients . . . espoused certain bizarre theories regarding
the origin of groundwater,” but by about 23 BCE “altered [their] misconception[s] and correctly hypothesized
that precipitation and surface water infiltration was the source of all groundwater”).
13
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Wis. 1974) (“Even [by]
1903, the awe of mysterious, unknowable forces beneath the earth was fast becoming an outmoded basis for a
rule of law.”); First Interim Report of the Special Master at 45, Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368 (2011) (No.
137) (asserting scientists and courts recognized connection between surface water and groundwater at least by
the 1920s). See generally Water as One Resource: How Interactions Between Groundwater and Surface Water
Impact Water Available, AM. GEOSCIS. INST. (July 13, 2015), https://www.americangeosciences.org/webinars/
water-as-one-resource (discussing hydrologic interactions and their implications for effective water
management).
14
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional Conjunctive Management,
47 IDAHO L. REV. 273, 279–80 (2011).
15
Id. at 278–79 (explaining that about forty percent of the nation’s surface stream flow relies on
groundwater and concluding that “the potential for groundwater withdrawals to affect the availability of surface
water is obvious”).
16
Griggs, A Fifty-Year Retrospective, supra note 11.
17
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 448.
18
See CECH, supra note 2, at 105 (identifying “the direction and speed of groundwater movement [as]
extremely important in many facets of groundwater hydrology”).
19
Id. at 106–07.
20
Id. at 93–94.
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interactions between surface and underground water. Such determinations rely
primarily on the expensive and time-consuming development of computer
groundwater models.21 More recently, a pair of NASA-launched satellites that
measure changes in Earth’s gravity caused by groundwater movement have
begun to develop the capacity to monitor groundwater from space.22
B. Groundwater as Legal Construct
Water law began to develop at least by the mid-nineteenth century,23 about
fifty years before science understood the hydrologic cycle24 and almost a century
before the “groundwater revolution” vastly increased our ability to efficiently
pump groundwater.25 As a consequence, the law has been slow to reflect
scientific knowledge, instead separating water into rigid categories that make
little hydrologic sense.26 In the hands of jurists, the descriptor “groundwater”
can ossify the location of a particular molecule of water at a particular point in
time into an immutable characteristic, with little recognition of water’s
movement throughout the hydrologic cycle.27 Factually inaccurate
understandings of groundwater remained surprisingly sticky in the law, even
after scientists had refined their knowledge.28 Perhaps this can be explained as
21
Leshy, supra note 2, at 1479; Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Geology and Hydrology of Groundwater, in
2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.02 (2021) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2020) (explaining that “[u]ncertainties
still exist about physical conditions of groundwater” and the “precise constitution, location, extent, and other
characteristics of [certain] aquifers are expensive and time-consuming to determine, if they can be determined
at all”); DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 254–55 (5th ed. 2015) (explaining that it “can be
difficult and expensive” to prove a tributary connection between groundwater and surface streams); see also
Taiawagi Helton & Rhett Larson, Prior Appropriation: Introduction and Background, in 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 11.06 (1.01) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2020) (observing “even where groundwater was included in
the prior appropriation system, it was often not managed conjunctively with surface water”).
22
Gloria Hicks, Getting at Groundwater with Gravity: Scientists Use a Pair of New Satellites to Keep Up
with Groundwater Resources, NASA EARTHDATA, https://earthdata.nasa.gov/learn/sensing-our-planet/gettingat-groundwater-with-gravity (Dec. 27, 2020, 8:02 PM).
23
See infra Part II.A.1.
24
See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
25
See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
26
Although some jurists acknowledged hydrologic connections by the early-twentieth century, many
continued to persist in willful ignorance until much later. See, e.g., Samuel C. Wiel, Need of Unified Law for
Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 358, 362 (1929) (noting the “connection between surface
streams and groundwater is usual, and in fact invariable”) (emphasis omitted); Leshy, supra note 2, at 1478
(explaining the law continued to “turn a blind eye” to the connection between surface water and groundwater,
and showed little desire to obtain detailed information until long after scientists recognized hydrologic
connections).
27
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Wis. 1974) (describing as
“arbitrary” a “distinction between the rules to be applied to water on the basis of where it happens to be found”
and concluding there is “little justification for property rights in ground water to be considered absolute while
rights in surface streams are subject to a doctrine of reasonable use”).
28
See, e.g., infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3, II.C.3 & II.D.3 (discussing rationales offered in support of various
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“path dependence”—the tendency for early outcomes to set in motion a
sequence of events that shape later outcomes, establishing a path that is not
necessarily efficient, logical, or easy to predict.29 But when lawmakers and
advocates embrace outmoded hydrologic understandings, they risk tainting the
analysis as an exercise in willful ignorance, strategic manipulation, or
disingenuous post-hoc rationalization of desired outcomes.
In the context of state water rights, one legendary practitioner quipped that
the law created a “hydrologic bicycle” that allocated rights to use surface water
and groundwater under two distinct legal regimes without regard for the intimate
connection of all water sources.30 Not content with creating an artificial chasm
between surface and underground water, jurists crafted still more extra-scientific
subcategories of groundwater. In an influential 1894 text, attorney Clesson S.
Kinney posited an inexhaustible supply of groundwater, which he subdivided
into subcategories based more on subjective human understanding than
hydrologic principles: “subterranean watercourses”; water “percolating”
through “unknown channels”; and the known “subflow” of surface streams.31
Such classifications, with some modifications, have endured, and today most
states recognize the bifurcation of groundwater into underground streams (or
underflow) regulated under the same rules as surface water, and percolating
groundwater regulated (if at all) under more lenient rules.32 This shunting of
groundwater into its own category is assisted by legal presumptions. In many

groundwater exclusions).
29
See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change
in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604–05 (2001) (observing that “courts’ early resolutions of
legal issues can become locked-in and resistant to change” and that legal rules can “fail to respond to changing
underlying conditions”). The theory of path dependence has been applied in a variety of contexts, including
economics, history, and the social sciences. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of
Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (evaluating the theory
in the context of economics); Joseph Russomanno, The “Central Meaning” and Path Dependence: The
Madison-Meiklejohn-Brennan Nexus, 20 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 117 (2015) (evaluating the theory in the context
of history and philosophy).
30
Leshy, supra note 2, at 1480 (citing Raphael Moses, Basic Groundwater Problems, 14 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 501, 503 (1968)).
31
GLENNON, supra note 9, at 29–30 (complaining that “[u]nfortunately, American groundwater law has
never recovered from the contributions of Clesson Kinney” and noting it is “relatively easy” to obtain
groundwater rights, in contrast to new surface water rights). As one geologist-turned-law-professor recalled,
“Although I studied hydrogeology as an undergraduate and then worked as an environmental geologist, I never
even heard the phrase ‘known and definite channels’ before coming to law school.” Dave Owen, Taking
Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 268 n.103 (2013) [hereinafter Owen, Taking Groundwater].
32
See generally Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6
WATER L. REV. 269, 273–74 (2003) (arguing such water law terms “are geographic conceptions fundamentally
at odds with science’s understanding of water’s movement” and that such terms erroneously assume “there is a
fixed space within which water is the underflow of a stream, and beyond that space the water is something else”).
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cases, the law presumes underground water is percolating groundwater, and
therefore insufficiently connected to surface water to justify regulation.33 The
burden of proof—too difficult or expensive for many small water users to
satisfy—is generally on those who seek to integrate groundwater into the
hydrologic cycle.34
The law’s over-classification impulse manifests also as a distinction between
water quantity and water quality. This artificial distinction often seeks refuge
under the umbrella of federalism.35 Matters of water quantity have long been the
province of state water rights law,36 whereas water quality is protected primarily
by federal pollution control law.37 The quantity/quality divide is bolstered also
by textualism. In determining the scope of federal authority over water pollution,
Justice Scalia and other textualists defined hydrologic terms by reference to lay
sources such as Webster’s Second International Dictionary rather than scientific
authorities.38
The failure of lawmakers to acknowledge basic hydrologic principles
diminishes the integrity of the law. With reference to California water law,
Professor Joseph Sax complained that reliance on pseudo-scientific language to
construct legal categories “give[s] the enterprise a somewhat daffy air.”39
Likewise, Professors Robert Glennon and Thomas Maddock criticized a
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court that turned on a distinction between
tributary groundwater and subflow, even though the court acknowledged the
distinction to be “less precise than current theories.”40 They retorted that the
court’s analysis indeed represented an understanding of hydrology less precise
than modern knowledge “in the same way that the nineteenth century practice
of medicine, with bloodletting and leeches, is less precise than today’s medical
knowledge.”41

33

See infra Part II.A.2.
See GETCHES, supra note 21, at 254–55.
35
See, e.g., infra Part II.D.3.
36
See infra Part II.A (considering state water rights). See generally Anne W. Squier, Water Quality,
Water Quantity: The Reluctant Marriage, 21 ENV’T. L. 1081 (1991) (summarizing the proceedings of Lewis &
Clark Law School’s “Reluctant Marriage” conference).
37
See infra Part II.D (considering the federal Clean Water Act).
38
See infra Part II.D.3.
39
Sax, supra note 32, at 273.
40
Robert Jerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, In Search of Subflow: Arizona’s Futile Effort to
Separate Groundwater from Surface Water, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 567, 572–74 (1994) (criticizing In re Gen.
Adjudication of All Rts. to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 857 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Ariz. 1993)).
41
Id. at 572.
34

KLEIN_1.31.22

2022]

1/31/2022 3:00 PM

GROUNDWATER EXCEPTIONALISM

497

C. Groundwater as Exceptional
As this Article will explore, numerous legal doctrines recognize exceptions
for groundwater and treat it differently than surface water. Often, this creates
loopholes that water users can exploit to circumvent the more onerous rules that
generally apply to surface water. The legal treatment of groundwater in the
United States is exceptional in an additional sense: As many countries across the
globe experience water shortages due to drought, climate change, and other
factors, each must struggle to develop an effective response. Increasingly, such
responses incorporate elements of so-called “conjunctive management,” which
recognizes the connectedness of the hydrological cycle and the need to
coordinate use of surface water and groundwater into a single portfolio of
resources.42 Although an international comparative analysis is beyond the scope
of this Article, as a general matter the success of such efforts depends, in part,
on the ability of individual nations to engage in collective action.43 In that sense,
groundwater management in the United States is “exceptional” from that of
other nations, and is shaped by the United States’ character, experience, and
governance structures.44
What can account for groundwater exceptionalism’s tenacity, even as
advances in scientific knowledge weaken its underpinnings? Beyond the
potential explanation supplied by the theory of path dependence,45 the broader
notion of American exceptionalism furnishes some insights into the deeply
rooted national values that nourish special treatment of groundwater. According
to one historian, American exceptionalism is more than the truism that each
nation—including the United States—is unique from all others.46 Instead, it is
42
See, e.g., Cameron Holley, Darren Sinclair, Elena Lopez-Gunn & Edella Schlager, Conjunctive
Management Through Collective Action, in INTEGRATED GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT 230 (A.J. Jakeman et
al. eds., 2016) (warning against the undesirable effects of “the ‘disjointed’ use of groundwater”); see infra Part
II.A.2 (identifying conjunctive management as a promising development in state water rights law to move
beyond groundwater exceptionalism).
43
Holley et al., supra note 42, at 231 (asking “what types of settings encourage broad-based collective
action by water users and governments to deliver conjunctive management?” and examining the relative
feasibility of collective action in Australia, Spain, and the western United States as “three leaders in water reform
and conjunctive management approaches”); Andrew Ross, Speeding the Transition Towards Integrated
Groundwater and Surface Water Management in Australia, 567 J. HYDROLOGY e1, e2 (2017) (comparing
conjunctive water management in Australia and the western United States, and identifying barriers to conjunctive
water management).
44
See Holley et al., supra note 42 (suggesting broad-based collective action is useful for adequately
addressing water shortages); see also Dave Owen, Law, Land Use, and Groundwater Recharge, 73 STAN. L.
REV. 1163, 1212 (2021) [hereinafter Owen, Law, Land Use] (suggesting a “communitarian” ethic could facilitate
groundwater reform in underdeveloped law of groundwater recharge).
45
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
46
Ian Tyrrell, American Exceptionalism, from Stalin with Love, AEON (Oct. 10, 2016), https://aeon.co/
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an assertion that the United States “follows a path of history different from the
laws or norms that govern other countries,” a path that can make the United
States morally superior.47 Core attributes hailed as evidence of American
superiority include prosperity, capitalism, and liberty.48 Exceptionalism
represents a powerful cultural narrative that Americans tell themselves to
explain why they are not subject to the same rules that apply to other nations.49
Even if not literally true, the story reveals the profound aspirations of those who
tell it.
As relevant to this Article, groundwater exceptionalism builds on the same
storied national attributes of prosperity, capitalism, and liberty that undergird
American exceptionalism. And it likewise weaves those traits into a narrative as
to why groundwater should not be subject to the same rules that apply to its
surface counterpart. Emphasizing prosperity, exceptionalists celebrate the
abundance of natural resources American settlers had at their disposal as they
pushed the frontier westward.50 Later, lawyers such as Clesson Kinney applied
a similar narrative of abundance to groundwater, with a supply he regarded as
inexhaustible.51 The capitalism norm, as relevant to water, pushes for the
commodification or privatization of natural resources, including water and
wetlands in some cases. In the view of one environmental economist, American
exceptionalism is marked principally by secure private property rights in land
and other physical resources.52 Finally, the norm of liberty manifests in the
hydrologic context as antipathy to regulation. One water scholar perceives
manifestations of “individualism” in groundwater doctrines, which generally
ideas/american-exceptionalism-from-stalin-with-love [hereinafter Tyrrell, American Exceptionalism].
47
Id.; see also Ian Tyrrell, American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History, 96 AM. HIST.
REV. 1031, 1033–34 (1991) [hereinafter Tyrrell, An Age of International History] (criticizing American
exceptionalism as an “occupational hazard among all historians” that threatens to obscure transnational
similarities and interconnections). But see Michael Kammen, The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A
Reconsideration, 45 AM. Q. 1 (1993) (identifying Ian Tyrrell as a polarizing figure).
48
Tyrrell, American Exceptionalism, supra note 46 (identifying a dichotomy between Europe and
America as “the crucible in which American exceptionalist thinking formed”).
49
Id. (arguing that the current “hyperbolic use” of the phrase has rendered exceptionalism into a counterfactual political ideology).
50
Tyrrell, An Age of International History, supra note 47, at 1034–35, 45.
51
See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
52
See generally Gary D. Libecap, Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24544, 2018) [hereinafter Libecap, Property Rights to Frontier
Land and Minerals] (asserting “[t]he distinct assignment of property rights to land and minerals is likely a basis
for long-term US exceptionalism in economic performance, individualism, mobility, and optimism”); Gary D.
Libecap, American Exceptionalism: Due Principally to Secure Private Property Rights, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM IN A NEW ERA 31, 31 (Thomas W. Gilligan ed., 2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/research/docs/amerex_ch3.pdf [hereinafter Libecap, American Exceptionalism] (asserting “[t]he United
States has been unusual in its protection of property, especially in the realm of physical resources like land”).
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tolerate unregulated “freedom of action” to pump groundwater in the absence of
specific proof of harm.53 Another commenter celebrates the United States’
“distinctive” regulatory takings doctrine as preserving a type of liberty to freely
use land, water, and other resources without what he views as “expansive
regulatory overreach.”54
II. THE DOCTRINES: A TYPOLOGY
This Part develops a typology of groundwater exceptionalism with the goal
of uncovering patterns that manifest across doctrines, as summarized in Table 1.
Four doctrines form the basis of the analysis: (1) state water rights law; (2) the
federal reserved rights doctrine; (3) interstate water allocation; and (4) the Clean
Water Act’s jurisdictional definitions of the waters subject to protection and the
polluting discharges subject to regulation. The first three doctrines concern
themselves with water quantity—the allocation of use rights among competing
claimants. The fourth category deals instead with water quality—the regulation
of pollution. Each doctrine has recognized exceptions for groundwater, treating
it more leniently than surface water or exempting it from regulation altogether.
Likewise, each doctrine has struggled as advancing hydrologic knowledge
makes it increasingly untenable to draw a bright legal line between surface and
underground water. Overall, the law is clearly moving away from
exceptionalism, but this progress has been inconsistent and still has far to go.
For each doctrine, Part II will present a summary of the relevant water
doctrine; an identification of the exceptions recognized for groundwater; the
rationales offered in support of such exceptions; and the legal and practical
consequences of subjecting groundwater and surface water to often inconsistent
regulations. As the analysis will reveal, the most prevalent rationales fall into
four groupings: (1) hydrologic ignorance: groundwater is too “secret” to
regulate (or too difficult or expensive to study fully in relation to surface water);
(2) water is land: groundwater should be regarded as part of the overlying
surface estate and subject to the same rules of ownership and use; (3) federalism:
groundwater should be regulated, if at all, by the states; and (4) textualism:
Congress (or the parties to an agreement) did not clearly indicate an intent to
regulate or allocate groundwater use.
53
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 473 (attributing the trait of “individualism” to groundwater
doctrines which promote “freedom of action where the effects of individual action cannot be demonstrated with
specific proof” (citing Joseph W. Dellapenna, Legal Classifications, in 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 19.05(b)(3) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2017))).
54
Libecap, American Exceptionalism, supra note 52, at 31–32 (highlighting the United States’
“distinctive” takings doctrine).
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The study will suggest two groupings of consequences. First, the special
treatment of groundwater leads to two macro-consequences: over-propertization
and under-regulation. Importantly, the descriptors “over” and “under” are not
primarily intended to advance normative claims as to the degree to which water
should be privatized or regulated to promote subjective policy goals. Rather, this
Article contends that exceptionalism goes too far when it supports bifurcated
treatment of groundwater and surface water based on nothing more than whether
a particular molecule is above- or below-ground at a particular moment in time.
Second, the study will also bring to light a number of adverse microconsequences, including hydrologic defiance (when the law draws lines between
surface water and groundwater in ways that do not conform to the actual
movement of water through the hydrologic cycle); analytical incoherence (when
groundwater exceptions lack supportable, consistent, and cogent explanations);
and doctrinal undermining (when exceptionalism creates loopholes and other
obstacles that prevent doctrines from achieving their underlying purposes,
including the allocation of scarce water supplies and environmental protection).
Table 1. A Typology of Groundwater Law
Doctrines

Rationales

Consequences

(1) State water rights

(1) Hydrologic
ignorance

(1) Macro-consequences

(2) Water is land

 Overpropertization

(3) Interstate allocation

(3) Federalism

 Under-regulation

 Interstate compacts

(4) Textualism

(2) Federal reserved
rights

 Equitable
apportionment

(4) The Clean Water Act
 Jurisdictional waters
 Jurisdictional
discharges

(2) Micro-consequences
 Hydrologic
defiance
 Analytical
incoherence
 Doctrinal
undermining

Overall, three broad patterns will emerge. First, Figure 1 conceptualizes
exceptionalism as a catalyst for the over-propertization and under-regulation of
groundwater. Although the mapping of rationales and consequences is
imperfect, the ignorance and land rationales provide an excuse for groundwater
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privatization;55 relatedly, the federalism and textualism rationales can impede
groundwater regulation. It might be possible to craft groundwater exclusions that
reconcile intra-doctrinal tensions and competing policy goals. But when jurists
and advocates proffer pseudo-scientific explanations untethered to the
hydrologic cycle, such assertions can mask subjective value preferences and
stifle robust policy debate.

Federalism rationale
Textualism rationale

Regulated

Unregulated

Figure 1. Exceptionalism’s Supporting Rationales and MacroConsequences

Exceptionalism

Hydrologic ignorance rationale
Water = land rationale

Shared resource

Private property

As a second broad pattern unpacked in this Part II, courts and legislators
have made significant progress toward integrating their treatment of surface
water and groundwater, but the progress has been inconsistent. In many cases,
they have been willing to support the regulation of groundwater that poses a
threat to surface water through depletion or pollution long before—often
decades or even a century before—they have been willing to recognize

55

See infra Part III.A.
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groundwater as a protected resource subject to regulation or protection in its
own right.56
Finally, as a third pattern, the rejection of exceptionalism has been hindered
by path dependence.57 If one considers groundwater exceptionalism as the
original sin of water doctrines, then mid-nineteenth century state water rights
law is the place where the sin was first committed.58 After the surface
water/groundwater divide became established in that context, it spread to other
water-related doctrines, often without analysis as to whether such crosspollination was warranted. As a result, the law continued down the path of
exceptionalism long after science recognized the intricate interrelationships of
the hydrologic cycle.
A. State Water Rights Law
Each state has developed a body of “water rights” law to allocate the right
to use water among competing claimants. Riparianism is the prevalent doctrine
in the relatively water-rich states east of the hundredth meridian—the
longitudinal line passing through North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.59 The more arid states to the west of that divide
generally adhere to the prior appropriation doctrine.60 Yet other states follow a
complicated hybrid of both canons.61 Despite their doctrinal differences,
virtually all states have succumbed to the temptation to exempt vast quantities
of underground water from the common law rules governing surface water use,
with apparently little regard for basic hydrologic principles.62 This may have
mattered little before we developed the technological capacity to withdraw vast
quantities of groundwater. But after the 1937 invention of the high-speed
centrifugal pump and the groundwater revolution it spawned,63 disputes over
56

See infra Parts II.B.2 (federal reserved rights), II.C.2 (interstate allocation) & II.D.2 (Clean Water Act).
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
58
See infra Part II.A.2.
59
CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER, BRET C. BIRDSONG, ALEXANDRA KLASS & ERIC BIBER,
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 911 (4th ed. 2018). The 100th
meridian has been described as an “aridity boundary.” The area east of the 100th meridian averages precipitation
of fifty-one centimeters (twenty inches) per year and makes farming possible without irrigation. Climate
scientists have noted, however, that this climatic boundary line is moving eastward as a consequence of climate
change and predict that the dry-humid boundary could shift to the ninety-eighth meridian by 2100. Harvey
Leifert, Dividing Line: The Past, Present and Future of the 100th Meridian, EARTH MAG. (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.earthmagazine.org/article/dividing-line-past-present-and-future-100th-meridian.
60
KLEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 922.
61
GETCHES, supra note 21, at 187–88 (describing hybrid riparian/appropriation systems).
62
Id.
63
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
57
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groundwater use intensified.64 Today, states confront the legacy of such
bifurcation as they struggle to conjunctively manage interconnected surface
water and groundwater resources, and to regulate two distinct sets of water users
whose expectations developed under inconsistent sets of rules.65 Even
California, the vanguard of many innovations, lags behind and did not legislate
a statewide framework for long-term groundwater protection until the
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014.66
1. The Law
a. The Riparian Doctrine
The riparian doctrine predicates the right to use water on the ownership of
“riparian land,” typically defined as property that abuts a natural watercourse.67
This linkage between land and water is one of the core tenets of common law
riparianism, which views land and water as a single, inseparable unit.68 This
association is also one of the most criticized aspects of the doctrine, privileging
waterfront landowners to the exclusion of all others.69 Those who qualify as
riparian landowners have the right to divert from adjacent surface streams and
lakes, whereas nonriparians have no such right and must rely on more expensive
groundwater pumping or other means of satisfying their needs.70
Despite their broad advantage, riparian landowners must observe two
qualifications.71 First, the use must be “reasonable” in terms of both purpose and
quantity of water used. The law declares a use “unreasonable” if it interferes
with the reasonable use of competing riparians, at times employing the maxim
of nuisance law, “sic utere tuo, ut non alienum laedas.”72 This comparative
64
Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 267 (2013) [hereinafter
Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law] (noting the increase of groundwater litigation and legislative
intervention, particularly after World War II).
65
Thompson, Jr., supra note 14, at 280.
66
See Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., https://water.ca.
gov/programs/groundwater-management/sgma-groundwater-management (last visited Dec. 16, 2021)
(providing overview of legislation).
67
GREGORY S. WEBER, JENNIFER L. HARDER & BENNETT L. BEARDEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WATER LAW 250 n.2 (9th ed. 2014).
68
Id. at 253 n.9 (noting riparian rights have been described as “part and parcel of the land itself”).
69
Id. at 252 (“It is impossible for all people to be riparians.”).
70
Id.
71
See AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, at viii (2004).
72
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (translating maxim as “[u]se your property so as not
to damage another’s”); see also Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) (quoting
maxim without translation and holding that each riparian is entitled to make a reasonable use of the stream that
does not interfere with the reasonable use of others); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 849, ch. 13, topic 3,
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reasonableness analysis takes place against an ever-shifting landscape: A use
adjudged reasonable at one point in time can become unreasonable as more
riparians and more intensive uses come to depend on the same waterbody.73 As
a consequence, the scope of a riparian water right is imprecise, making it
difficult for landowners to plan and invest with certainty in the future uses of
their property.74 As a second limitation, riparian law regulates the place of use.
Under the so-called “on tract rule,” landowners must use water on the same
parcel of land that abuts the source from which the water was drawn.75 Under
the overlapping “watershed limitation,” water must be used in the same
watershed from which it was extracted and may not be transported across a
hydrologic divide to a different basin.76 Both rules aim to restrict use to nearby
lands so that any unused amounts return by gravity flow to the watercourse from
which the water was diverted.77 Overall, both rules reinforce the concept of
water as an inseparable component of real property.78
Common law riparianism thus takes on the aura of property law—limiting
water use to people who own riparian land and places near the water source. At
the same time, riparianism resembles tort law as it weighs the impact of each
landowner’s water use on fellow riparians sharing the same source.79 Toward
the end of the twentieth century, the law began to emphasize the latter aspect.
The 1979 Restatement (Second) of Torts, for example, locates the riparian rights
doctrine within chapters on tort law, not property.80 But despite its nod toward
tort law, the Restatement (Second) clings also to property-based policy,
particularly in the context of groundwater. It asserts that “water is for many
purposes treated like a part of the land over which it flows, and the rights, duties
and privileges with respect to its use are not different in principle from those
with respect to the soil, minerals and other substances that make up the land.”81
Section 858 specifically addresses liability for the use of groundwater. As the
intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1979) (applying common law maxim requiring landowners to use their own property
in such a manner as to not injure that of another).
73
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 53, 69–
70 (2011).
74
Id.
75
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 29–30.
76
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Use Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(a)(1.01)(2)
(2021) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2020) (explaining watershed limitation).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 841–857 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
80
Id. § 849, intro. note (explaining that with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, courts desired to
permit “the fullest beneficial use of the rivers and streams,” and thus “[t]he use, not the stream, came to be the
thing protected by law, and injury to a reasonable use became the tort”).
81
Id.
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comments explain, that section “retains the property basis of the common law
rules pertaining to ground water” and encourages “more or less unrestricted
development of the [groundwater] resource by those who have access to it.”82
Despite riparianism’s effort to thread the needle between overly-rigid
property law and imprecisely-comparative tort law, commentators remain
unconvinced of the doctrine’s continued usefulness—whether in the form of the
common law or of the Restatement.83 Instead, a number of states have enacted
statutory water codes that supplant or supplement common law riparianism—
generally under the name of “regulated riparianism.”84
b. The Prior Appropriation Doctrine
Most western states rejected riparianism, instead adopting the prior
appropriation doctrine—a system they saw as more compatible with the arid
conditions of the American West.85 The doctrine protects only “beneficial uses”
of water,86 a rough counterpart to riparianism’s analysis of the reasonableness
of both the purpose and amount of water diverted from natural sources.87 Also
like riparianism, common law appropriation focused almost exclusively on
diversions from surface water supplies such as streams and lakes.88 But the
similarities stop there: two of appropriation’s defining characteristics depart
dramatically from eastern riparianism. First, the appropriation doctrine allocates
water supplies according to temporal priority89 rather than require sharing
among users. The governing rule is “first in time, first in right,” a principle often
said to be rooted in the customs of California and Colorado mining camps that
sprang up during the gold rush of the 1840s and 1850s.90 The oldest “senior”
82
Id. § 858, cmt. (b); see also J. David Aiken, Hydrologically Connected Ground Water, Section 858,
and the Spear T Ranch Decision, 84 NEB. L. REV. 962, 988 (2006) (suggesting § 858 confines its regulatory
scope to “subflow” in close proximity to surface streams, leaving unregulated other tributary groundwater
located further from the surface channel).
83
Robert H. Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist Theory of Change, 35
WAYNE L. REV. 1381, 1400–02 (1989) (opining that the Restatement (Second) offers “little help indeed” in the
resolution of recurrent “hard cases”).
84
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 106 W. VA. L. REV.
539, 583–93 (2004) (estimating that about half of the eastern states had developed “administrative permit
systems to replace traditional riparian rights” as of 2004, and observing that few realize “regulated riparianism
represent[s] a truly different model of water law”); REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 71.
85
KLEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 921–23.
86
Id. at 922.
87
See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
88
KLEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 921–23.
89
Whereas the riparian analysis tends to compare one water use to another, appropriation’s beneficial use
analysis considers only the subject water use apart from all others. See id. at 922–23.
90
See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882) (recognizing appropriation doctrine

KLEIN_1.31.22

506

1/31/2022 3:00 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:487

water users are entitled to fully satisfy their water rights before more recent
“junior” water users receive even a single drop of water.91 Second, unlike
riparianism, appropriation does not regulate the place of use. Instead, it is
common for appropriators to dig ditches to transport streamflow long distances
to the ultimate place of use—often across watershed boundaries or even across
mountain ranges.92
Some of the oldest surface water rights date back to the mid-nineteenth
century.93 In contrast, groundwater pumping by high capacity wells did not
become technologically or economically feasible until about a century later—
around the time of World War II.94 Because common law appropriation doctrine
excepted some or all groundwater, well owners simply began to pump from their
wells without the need for legal authorization, effectively jumping the line in
terms of priority where underground and surface sources were hydrologically
connected.95 As a consequence of the long-standing exception of groundwater
from regulation, the law would struggle to play “catch up” to coordinate surface
water and groundwater law.
c. Groundwater Doctrines
Many states have separate rules for the diversion of surface water and the
pumping of groundwater. Notably, groundwater use is either generally
unregulated or more leniently regulated than diversions from surface
watercourses.96 In California, for example, most groundwater was classified as
“percolating” and free of any state permit requirements until the passage of

in Colorado); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146–47 (1855) (recognizing prior appropriation doctrine in
California). See generally Burke W. Griggs, Water: Practical Challenges and Legal Rights to Acquire and
Recycle Water for Hydraulic Fracturing, in 2018 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. J. 10-1, 10-15 (2019) [hereinafter
Griggs, Water: Practical Challenges] (tracing the history of the prior appropriation doctrine to California during
the 1840s and Colorado during the 1850s).
91
KLEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 922–23; see also GETCHES, supra note 21, at 105 (explaining that the
prior appropriation doctrine “allows the full senior right to be exercised before the junior can use any water” in
times of shortage).
92
See GETCHES, supra note 21, at 152, 154 (describing transbasin diversions and diversions across the
continental divide).
93
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
94
See Glennon, supra note 9, at 26; Griggs, A Fifty-Year Retrospective, supra note 11, at 166.
95
See, e.g., Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 991–92 (Colo. 1968) (acknowledging the detrimental
impact of well pumping on senior surface water rights holders).
96
See, e.g., Kevin O’Brien, Richard Frank, Andy Sawyer, Alletta Belin & Paul Kibel, Proceedings of the
2019 California Water Law Symposium Panel Organized by GGU School of Law: SGMA and Interconnected
Groundwater-Surface Water, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. ENV’T L.J. 81, 83, 85 (2020) (citing California as an extreme
example of a state that long failed to integrate the law of surface water and groundwater).
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groundwater legislation in 2014.97 Groundwater rules fall into roughly five
categories—sometimes overlapping and confused with one another. First, early
courts applied a rule of capture called the “absolute dominion doctrine” (also
known as the “English rule” or “absolute ownership rule”),98 which views
underground water as part of the surface estate that “belongs” to the landowner
and that can be pumped without regard for impact on others.99 As groundwater
use increased by the middle of the twentieth century, many states found the
doctrine unworkable.100 Instead, judges and legislators adopted second and third
doctrines they called “correlative rights” and “reasonable use,” or a confusing
hybrid of both.101 Yet a fourth group of jurisdictions has followed the approach
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, although commentators do not agree on
whether the Restatement set forth a new rule or codified existing common
law.102 Overall, though, these departures from the absolute dominion rule apply
some restrictions to groundwater pumping and require some degree of sharing
in times of shortage.103 Finally, a fifth group of states has extended the western
prior appropriation doctrine to groundwater, but with modifications that provide
for more relaxed restrictions on groundwater than surface water use.104
Particularly of note, some western states allow for the “mining” of aquifers,
which permits well pumping at rates anticipated to exhaust the underground
97

Id. at 82–83, 85.
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Rise and the Demise of the Absolute Dominion Doctrine for Groundwater,
35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 291, 292, 297 (2013) [hereinafter Dellapenna, The Rise and the Demise]. See
generally Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1226 (Exch. Chamber 1843) (cited by Dellapenna, The Rise
and the Demise, supra, at 296, as the case that “has come to be identified as the source of the absolute dominion
doctrine, notwithstanding its earlier adoption in Massachusetts”); Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117,
121, 123 (1836) (cited by Dellapenna, The Rise and the Demise, supra, at 295, as the first reported common law
case that clearly articulated the doctrine).
99
Dellapenna, The Rise and the Demise, supra note 98, at 300–01. Despite the language of “belonging,”
courts rarely find that landowners have a sufficient property interest in groundwater to trigger takings liability if
states enact legislation that purports to regulate groundwater use. Id. at 308–15.
100
Id. at 305–06, 318–22 (suggesting only a handful of states, most notably including Texas, still adhere
to the doctrine).
101
Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, supra note 64, at 270.
102
Id. at 294–97.
103
Id. at 292–97 (arguing judicial ambiguity makes it impossible to definitively conclude whether the
reasonable use doctrine weighs the harm caused by defendant’s pumping in the abstract or in relation to the
plaintiff’s water use). States following the Restatement also relax surface riparianism’s rigid restrictions on the
place of use. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (Am. L. Inst. 1979) (liability for use of ground water
subject to a number of factors, none of which includes place of use); id. at cmt. d (“Whether ground water is
used on or off the overlying land involves much the same considerations as whether stream water is used on
riparian or nonriparian land.”).
104
Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, supra note 64, at 299–302; Dellapenna, The Rise and the
Demise, supra note 98, at 306–07; GETCHES, supra note 21, at 231 (“Allocation of rights in groundwater strictly
based on prior use is not practical; a senior groundwater appropriator theoretically could demand that no
pumping be allowed because virtually any new pumping causes some effect on existing wells.”).
98
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supply over a specified period of time, generally measured by decades or even a
century.105 For example, 1965 Colorado legislation called for a 100-year life of
specified aquifers.106 This tolerance for draining underground aquifers in the
name of maximum beneficial use stands in contrast to surface appropriation law,
which premises water use on diversions of the annual water supply.
2. The Exceptions
Both the riparian and prior appropriation doctrines recognize exceptions for
“percolating” groundwater—defined as groundwater that seeps through the
pores of underground soil and rock, and interpreted as encompassing most
groundwater.107 Largely ignoring groundwater, each doctrine generally limits its
focus to surface streams, their associated “subflow,”108 and so-called
“underground streams” (also called “subterranean streams”).109 Despite the
significant consequences flowing from these classifications, they have been
created by lawyers with little regard for hydrologic principles or physical reality.
As one law professor explains, “Not the least of the continuing disconnects
between water science and water law is the continuing application, in most
states, of different bodies of law to surface waters and to groundwater even
though they are all part of a single hydrologic cycle—a fact that has long been
known.”110 These extra-scientific classifications are afforded additional weight
by a rebuttable presumption in many jurisdictions that underground water should
be classified as percolating and therefore exempt from regulation under surface

105
GETCHES, supra note 21, at 245–46 (discussing legislative schedules for groundwater mining, with
examples of aquifer life limitations ranging from 20 to 100 years).
106
See Colorado Groundwater Management Act of 1965, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-90-101, 37-90-102(2),
37-90-103(10.5)–(10.7).
107
Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, supra note 64, at 268.
108
See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rts. to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 857 P.2d
1236, 1242–43 (Ariz. 1993).
109
WEBER ET AL., supra note 67, at 366–67 (describing terminology and explaining “[t]he division of
groundwater into underground streams and percolating waters has been criticized for ignoring physical reality”);
Sax, supra note 32, at 272–73 (discussing historical treatment in California of underground watercourses, which
the state terms “subterranean stream[s]”); see also Woodsum v. Township of Pemberton, 412 A.2d 1064, 1067
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (dividing groundwater into regulated underground streams and unregulated
percolating waters, with a presumption in favor of the latter); Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 245 P. 369, 371 (Ariz.
1926) (applying prior appropriation law to groundwater demonstrated to flow as underground stream); Hayes v.
Adams, 218 P. 933, 935 (Or. 1923) (distinguishing underground streams flowing in “a known and well-defined
natural channel” from percolating waters, which are a “constituent part of the land and belong to the owner of
the land”).
110
Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, supra note 64, at 268; see supra Part II.A.1.

KLEIN_1.31.22

2022]

1/31/2022 3:00 PM

GROUNDWATER EXCEPTIONALISM

509

doctrines.111 This establishes a difficult burden of proof for surface riparians
seeking regulation of competing well pumpers.112
Under a second exception of particular relevance in western states,
“nontributary” groundwater is often exempt from regulation under the surface
appropriation doctrine.113 Unlike the exception for percolating groundwater,
which focuses on the physical location of water within an aquifer, the
nontributary exception considers whether the subject groundwater has a
sufficiently direct hydrologic connection to surface streams to support
regulation.114 Although commendable for its focus on the functional impacts of
groundwater use, the nontributary determination can be convoluted and mindnumbingly complex. For example, Colorado statutory law regulates
groundwater with different degrees of stringency115 based on whether it is
demonstrated to be “tributary,”116 “nontributary,”117 or “not nontributary”118—
categories invented by lawyers, not hydrogeologists. As a positive sign,
however, states such as Colorado follow a presumption that groundwater is
tributary and therefore subject to regulation,119 the opposite of the common law
presumption attached to the percolating groundwater exception in many
instances.120
111

Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, supra note 64, at 268.
GETCHES, supra note 21, at 221 (explaining that some states subject groundwater flowing as an
underground stream to the law of surface streams rather than groundwater law).
113
See, e.g., Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Protecting Prior Appropriation Water Rights Through Integrating
Tributary Groundwater: Colorado’s Experience, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 5, 11–12 (2010) (discussing historical
development of groundwater regulation in Colorado); Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo.
1951) (recognizing the presumption that all groundwater in Colorado is tributary to a surface stream and subject
to prior appropriation).
114
See GETCHES, supra note 21, at 254 (defining “tributary” as “groundwater that has a hydrologic
connection with a surface stream that is sufficiently direct to warrant legal attention”).
115
See generally Groundwater Resources, COLO. STATE UNIV., https://waterknowledge.colostate.edu/
hydrology/groundwater-resources (last visited Dec. 16, 2021) (describing various categories of groundwater that
are subject to different types of management in Colorado); Griggs, Water: Practical Challenges, supra note 90,
at 10-12–14 (describing different legal classifications of groundwater under Colorado law).
116
GETCHES, supra note 21, at 255 (describing presumption that water is tributary if its pumping would
affect a surface stream within forty years).
117
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) (2021) (defining “nontributrary groundwater” as groundwater
located outside specified aquifers “the withdrawal of which will not, within one hundred years of continuous
withdrawal, deplete the flow of a natural stream . . . at an annual rate greater than one-tenth of one percent of the
annual rate of withdrawal”).
118
Id. § 37-90-103(10.7) (2021) (defining “not nontributary groundwater” as groundwater located in
certain aquifers, “the withdrawal of which will, within one hundred years, deplete the flow of a natural stream
. . . at an annual rate of greater than one-tenth of one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal”).
119
Hobbs, supra note 113, at 11 (discussing presumption of groundwater as tributary “[i]f the groundwater
would reach the surface stream within one hundred years or its pumping would affect the surface stream within
one hundred years”).
120
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
112
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As yet a third exception, many states also exempt small domestic wells from
regulation, presumably under the rationale that the impacts from such smallscale pumping will be de minimis.121 But this assumption is belied by the
evidence: As demonstrated by one study, some 2.5 million domestic wells in the
West enjoyed such an exemption, even though many likely pumped groundwater
in competition with appropriators from nearby surface streams. The study’s
authors concluded that “[i]t is not sound policy to address the problem of large
capacity groundwater wells interfering with surface flow and at the same time
exempt small capacity wells which, cumulatively, may have an equally dramatic
effect.”122
As early as 1929, prominent water lawyer Samuel Wiel viewed such
exceptions unworkable in light of the hydrologic connection between surface
water and groundwater.123 Responding decades later,124 the states have begun to
move toward conjunctive management, defined by one source as “the integration
of the management of surface water resources with the management of
groundwater and other water resources (such as atmospheric waters),” under a
regime that “takes into account the interconnections of surface and subsurface
waters within the drainage basin.”125 For riparian jurisdictions, the 1997
Regulated Riparian Model Water Code prescribes water management
“consistent with physical laws,” including “ensuring conjunctive management
of surface and underground waters.”126 Western states, too, have joined in.127
But both eastern and western jurisdictions have been hindered by delays, costs,
and lack of political will.128 Overall, despite a growing recognition of the need

121
WEBER ET AL., supra note 67, at 369 (surmising that the domestic well exemption “apparently rests on
the premise that it is not worth the time and trouble to require a permit for de minimis uses”).
122
Id. (quoting Robert Jerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, The Concept of Capture: The Hydrology
and Law of Stream/Aquifer Interactions, 43 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1 (1997)) (measuring as of the start
of the twenty-first century).
123
Wiel, supra note 26, at 362–64.
124
Colorado, for example, included some groundwater classified as “tributary” in its prior appropriation
doctrine by 1969 legislation. Hobbs, supra note 113, at 13.
125
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Necessity for Conjunctive and Integrated Management, in 2 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 18.03 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2021); see also THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 537
(discussing conjunctive management).
126
REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, supra note 71, § 1R-1-03, at 5.
127
See, e.g., Kobobel v. Colo. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1135 (Colo. 2011) (explaining how the
state adopted legislation in 1969 to integrate the use of some groundwater known as “tributary” with the use of
surface water after the state supreme court “acknowledged the detrimental impact of well pumping on senior
surface water rights holders” in 1968).
128
Dellapenna, supra note 125 (“[T]oday we have the means for obtaining sufficient information about
groundwater to allow conjunctive and integrated management, if we are willing to bear the expense.”).
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for holistic management of surface and underground water, the full promise of
conjunctive management has not yet been realized.129
3. The Rationales
Perhaps the most common rationale for the law’s unique treatment of
groundwater is that we simply do not—and cannot—know enough about it to
craft meaningful regulation.130 In the 1850 decision Roath v. Driscoll, the
Connecticut Supreme Court declined to protect an existing well owner from
interference by a neighbor whose subsequently constructed well cut off the
supply of the first well.131 In often-cited language, the court asserted:
Water, whether moving or motionless in the earth, is not, in the eyes
of the law, distinct from the earth. The laws of its existence and
progress, while there, are not uniform, and cannot be known or
regulated. . . . These influences are so secret, changeable, and
[uncontrollable], we cannot subject them to the regulations of law, nor
build upon them a system of rules, as has been done with streams upon
the surface.132

The rationale has also justified judicial failures to protect surface riparians from
depletions caused by neighboring groundwater pumpers.133 In the 1861 decision
Frazier v. Brown, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to intervene in
a dispute between neighbors relying on surface water and groundwater,
respectively.134 In support of its holding, the court asserted that attempts to
regulate groundwater “would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would be,
therefore, practically impossible.”135
As a second justification for weak groundwater regulation, some
jurisdictions forthrightly favor specific policy goals, even at the expense of

129

See Thompson, Jr., supra note 14, at 305–06.
See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Mid-Nineteenth Century Choices and the Knowledge
Underlying Them, in 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 19.02 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2020) (discussing
prominent usage of “one dramatic word—‘occult’” to describe groundwater knowledge in the mid-nineteenth
century).
131
Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 541, 543–44 (1850).
132
Id. at 541.
133
See, e.g., Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861) (holding in favor of defendant whose pumping
of percolating groundwater interfered with plaintiff’s use of surface spring and rivulet), overruled by Cline v.
Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984).
134
Id. at 295–96, 312.
135
Id. at 311.
130
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hydrological accuracy. Both eastern136 and western137 jurisdictions routinely
promote the “[m]aximum utilization” of water resources, at times buttressed by
the myth that groundwater is plentiful.138 In other cases, some jurisdictions
regulate groundwater leniently to avoid the administrative difficulties of
determining the precise impact of well pumping on complaining surface water
users.139 As one writer noted, the law “did not divide surface waters and
groundwater into different regimes because we did not know about the
interconnection; the law divided them because we lacked the wherewithal to
determine the nature of the interconnection in specific cases.”140
Under a third rationale, courts countenance lenient groundwater regulation
to promote particular outcomes or parties. Early judges were loath to stifle water
uses they saw as critical to technological advancement and social progress, an
approach that tended to favor large industrial users over smaller groundwater
pumpers. In 1850, for example, the Connecticut Supreme Court expressed its
reluctance to allow the owners of “comparatively unimportant” wells to prevent
pumping by other wells supporting important developing industries.141
Sometimes, courts refuse to regulate groundwater pumping because of a desire
to promote the interests of one party over another by placing an unacknowledged
judicial thumb on the scales of justice. In the wryly-titled article We Don’t Do
Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, Professor Joseph Sax
chronicled how the California Supreme Court as far back as 1899 engaged in
136
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977) (discussing a policy of
encouraging groundwater use and allowing “more or less unrestricted development”).
137
See, e.g., Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (declining to protect surface water rights
dating back as far as 1887 from withdrawals by well drilled in 1935, in part to promote the “[m]aximum
utilization” of the waters of the state).
138
See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977) (justifying intensive use
of groundwater by “the fact that since most ground water basins are very large and contain vast quantities of
water, it is usually impossible for a single water user to capture the entire supply and leave no water for others”).
139
See, e.g., Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code: Blueprint for Twenty First
Century Water Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 113, 118–19 (2000) (discussing how the
model code encompasses the entire hydrologic cycle of both surface water and groundwater).
140
Id. at 118; see also ANTHONY DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 6:9 (2021)
(“In theory, a groundwater permit [in a prior appropriation jurisdiction] should not be issued if it interferes with
existing rights,” but there is “little traditional enforcement of priorities” of one well versus another because
“there is seldom an absolute shortage” and it can be difficult to determine exactly which well is causing injury
to the plaintiff).
141
Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 541–42 (1850) (declining to regulate wells where such regulation
would prevent “the improvement of the neighbourhood, by draining marshes . . . and even the opening of mines
of metal or coal”); see also Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861) (refusing to curtail well pumping
where such efforts would “interfere, to the material detriment of the common wealth, with drainage and
agriculture, mining, the construction of highways and railroads, with sanitary regulations, building and the
general progress of improvement in works of embellishment and utility”), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates
Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984).
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what Sax called “doctrinal gymnastics” to recognize a meaningless distinction
between percolating groundwater and subterranean streams—all with the
unacknowledged goal of protecting the surface water rights of the growing city
of Los Angeles.142 As a consequence, Sax argued, for well over a century
California continued to follow a body of water law at odds with scientific reality,
leaving most groundwater virtually unregulated except under the nonsensical
label of subterranean streams.143
Under yet a fourth rationale for groundwater nonregulation, some courts
express constitutional discomfort, suggesting that regulation of groundwater
users could rise to the level of a regulatory taking. Reliance on such a rationale
can be an unsatisfying excuse for inaction if judicial misgivings fall short of
rigorous analysis, fail to determine whether a taking would actually occur under
the facts of the case, or stop short of drawing a supportable hydrologic line
between regulable and non-regulable sources of water.144
4. The Consequences
Groundwater exceptionalism adds a considerable degree of complexity to
water management. Well over a century ago, states began to develop common
law doctrine for surface water use, falling roughly into the categories of
riparianism, prior appropriation, or a dual approach.145 Multiple decades later,
states turned their attention to groundwater doctrine, developing a different
menu of options that often employed a different group of managers, sometimes

142
Sax, supra note 32, at 272, 278–82 (discussing, inter alia, City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585
(Cal. 1899) and concluding “[t]he plain fact is that while the outcome in Pomeroy, in favor of Los Angeles,
made good sense, the decision’s legal effort to define a part of the groundwater continuum as a ‘subterranean
stream’ was both a hydrogeological and public policy fiasco”).
143
Id. at 270; see also Burke W. Griggs, Reaching Consensus About Conservation: High Plains Lessons
for California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 52 U. PAC. L. REV. 495, 508 (2021) (explaining
“California long resisted the regulation of groundwater under a permit system, largely because of opposition
from irrigation interests in the San Joaquin Valley” until it passed a comprehensive regulatory plan for
groundwater, effective 2015); Jennifer L. Harder, Cognitive Dissonance or Harmonic Convergence?
California’s Groundwater Law and the Public Trust Doctrine, 65 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. ANN. INST. 241, 24-2 (2019) (describing how California did not begin to protect surface water from the effects of groundwater
pumping until 2014 and continues to follow an approach toward groundwater of “decentralization and nonregulation”).
144
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 347, 351 (Wis. 1974) (in a case
of first impression, selecting lenient groundwater doctrine, in part to avoid regulatory taking liability, and
concluding “the proposed change is not confiscatory in nature”); State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 255 P.2d 1007,
1009, 1018 (N.M. 1950) (holding constitutional a state statute subjecting artesian and shallow ground water to
regulation under principles of prior appropriation).
145
See supra Part II.A.
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at different levels of state government.146 As one commentator observed, “since
large-scale groundwater development lagged behind surface water development
by nearly a century or so, states struggled for decades with the question of
whether and how to incorporate groundwater within their existing legal
regimes.”147 Even in states that purport to apply similarly named doctrines to
both surface water and groundwater—such as “reasonable use” or “prior
appropriation”—doctrinal differences persist between the surface and
underground versions of the same doctrine.148 In modern times, this bifurcation
has left states scrambling to harmonize management through “conjunctive use”
or integrated management regimes—labels which according to one textbook
“though universally praised, [may] lack[] precise meaning.”149
The exception of groundwater from surface water management also has
profound implications for the political economy of water allocation—at times
tipping the balance between the “haves” and “have nots” in the world of water
rights. As Professor Burke Griggs notes in a series of articles, the law’s separate
treatment of surface water and groundwater gave rise to two distinct political
cultures in the West, both of which predominately used their water rights for
irrigated agriculture.150 Those who came before the “groundwater revolution”151
generally acquired their water rights under the prior appropriation doctrine’s rule
of “first in time, first in right.”152 This surface-water irrigation community
formed a distinct political culture, according to Griggs, displaying a number of
characteristics. Among other things, it tends to be “legally conservative” and to
support the basic tenets of the traditional prior appropriation doctrine.153 Later,
in the post-World War II period, modern technology made possible highcapacity wells that could pump thousands of gallons per minute from underlying

146
See Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, supra note 64, at 299 (observing “appropriation rules
for groundwater came almost eight decades after they had been developed for streams” and noting differences
between surface and underground application).
147
Griggs, Water: Practical Challenges, supra note 90, at 10–11.
148
See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Prior Appropriation: A Reassessment, 18 WATER L. REV. 228, 305–09
(2015).
149
WEBER ET AL., supra note 67, at 439; see also THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 537 (discussing
conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater as a management tool); MacDonnell, supra note 148, at 305
(identifying integration of tributary aquifers with surface water uses as “[p]erhaps the most pressing legal
problem related to groundwater in most states”).
150
Burke W. Griggs, The Political Cultures of Irrigation and the Proxy Battles of Interstate Water
Litigation, 57 NAT. RES. J. 1, 2–4, 7 (2017) [hereinafter Griggs, Political Cultures]; Griggs, Water: Practical
Challenges, supra note 90, at 10-7–8, 10-10.
151
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
152
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
153
Griggs, Political Cultures, supra note 150, at 26.
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aquifers.154 Farmers who rely on groundwater formed a separate and powerful
political culture, one hostile to government regulation in general, and to classic
prior appropriation doctrine in particular.155 Exempt from surface water
regulation in most cases, well owners could jump to the head of the prior
appropriation line and pump their wells even if they interfered with
hydrologically-connected surface water long ago allocated to senior surface
water users.156 Because of forces such as these, some have noted the vastly
diminished importance of “priority” in the groundwater version of the prior
appropriation doctrine.157
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, groundwater exceptionalism
encourages overuse of water supplies at a rate that far outpaces natural
replenishment through precipitation and recharge.158 Aquifer overuse is a
serious problem. For example, significant portions of the Ogallala Aquifer—
which underlies eight High Plains states—have seen water levels drop by 25 to
more than 150 feet from the period before the aquifer was tapped.159
B. Federal Reserved Water Rights
The reserved rights doctrine offers a hopeful example of where the courts
have increasingly rebuffed groundwater exceptionalists. It offers valuable
lessons about how the law can move from exceptionalism to integrity,160 despite
more than a century of challenges from the doctrine’s inception in 1908.161 The
154

Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 36.
156
See id. at 28–31 (explaining how lenient regulation of certain types of groundwater compromised the
doctrine of prior appropriation).
157
See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, Alive but Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western
Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 675, 710–11 (2012); Tarlock, supra note 140 (“[T]here is little traditional
enforcement of priorities in prior appropriation jurisdictions . . . .”).
158
See, e.g., Griggs, Political Cultures, supra note 150, at 30–31 (describing “massive . . .
overappropriation” of the portion of the Ogallala Aquifer underlying Kansas); see Dellapenna, A Primer on
Groundwater Law, supra note 64, at 316 (asserting the failure to manage underground water has led to “waste
and abuse” of groundwater); Wargia M. Bowman, Dustbowl Waters: Doctrinal and Legislative Solutions to Save
the Ogallala Aquifer Before Both Time and Water Run Out, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 1081, 1085–89 (2020)
(describing various American aquifers at risk of depletion).
159
Michon Scott, National Climate Assessment: Great Plains’ Ogallala Aquifer Drying Out, NOAA
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/national-climate-assessment-greatplains’-ogallala-aquifer-drying-out.
160
See infra Part III.B (discussing the reversal of under-regulation to restore the integrity of water law
doctrines).
161
See Federal Reserved Water Rights and State Law Claims, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.
gov/enrd/federal-reserved-water-rights-and-state-law-claims (May 12, 2015) (discussing the 1908 origin of the
reserved rights doctrine); Michael C. Blumm, Reserved Water Rights: Introduction, in 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 37.01(a.01) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2021) (noting that “numerous uncertainties [remain] . . .
155
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example also contributes to the pattern highlighted in the introduction to this
Part:162 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld regulation of groundwater that
threatens to deplete reserved surface waters since 1976, but the lower courts did
not begin to support the reservation of groundwater in its own right until 1999—
a step forward that has still not been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court.163
1. The Law
The federal government holds title to about twenty-eight percent of the land
within the United States, concentrated primarily in the western states.164 Under
the judicially-created federal reserved water rights doctrine, when the federal
government reserves its lands for a particular federal purpose, it impliedly
reserves appurtenant water sufficient to accomplish that purpose.165 The doctrine
was articulated in 1908 in connection with lands reserved for Native American
tribes,166 but was subsequently extended to lands reserved for national forests,
wildlife refuges, recreation areas, and other federal purposes.167
Reserved water rights date back to the time the land was reserved (often as
early as the nineteenth century), even if the government does not begin to
exercise its right until years or decades later. Thus, long dormant reserved rights
have the potential to take state water users by surprise and disrupt the
expectations established under state law, potentially calling for a “gallon-forgallon” reduction of state rights to fulfill federal reserved rights.168 To soften the
tension between federal and state water rights, courts have limited reserved
rights to the volume of water “necessary” to accomplish only the primary

regarding the nature and scope of reserved rights”).
162
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
163
Compare infra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Cappaert v. United States and its
injunction of groundwater pumping that threatens reserved rights), with infra note 185 and accompanying text
(discussing In re Gila River Sys. and its approval of reserved rights in groundwater) & infra note 187 and
accompanying text (discussing Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians and its approval of reserved rights in
groundwater).
164
KLEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 38.
165
Blumm, supra note 161. In public lands law, “reservation” refers to the dedication of lands held in
federal ownership for specified purposes. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 70 n.2.
166
NATHAN BROOKS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32198, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW
2 (2005), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050124_RL32198_51c82953d38e001132c5bf621cd0304cee
757349.pdf.
167
Blumm, supra note 161, § 37.01(b)(3); see also Federal Reserved Water Rights and State Law Claims,
supra note 161 (chronicling Supreme Court cases since 1908 extending federal reserved water rights).
168
See Blumm, supra note 161, § 37.01(c)(1) (explaining that because reserved rights are not lost by
nonuse, “state water rights holders arguably had little notice of the superior federal rights”); United States v.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705 (1978).
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purpose of the reservation169 and have often quantified that volume stintingly.170
Nevertheless, reserved rights remain highly controversial and have been
challenged on a number of grounds.171
Congressional intent is the touchstone of the doctrine, which pits the
purposes of federal reservations against the plight of those whose state water
rights are subject to curtailment. The doctrine was first recognized in 1908 in
Winters v. United States.172 There, the federal government had reserved the Fort
Belknap Reservation as “an Indian reservation and . . . a permanent home and
abiding place” for certain tribes in Montana.173 When non-tribal water users
began to divert water upstream for irrigation, the federal government sought to
enjoin such interference with the tribes’ own irrigation needs downstream.174
The state water users contended that their lands would be “ruined” and they
would be forced to “abandon their homes” if the federal reserved rights were
sustained, while the United States similarly argued that the arid lands reserved
for the Fort Belknap Reservation would be “practically valueless” without a
concomitant reservation of water.175 The U.S. Supreme Court sided with the
federal government and upheld the tribes’ reserved water right, noting that the
congressional purpose of converting the tribes into a “pastoral and civilized
people” would be thwarted without sufficient water for irrigation.176
2. The Exceptions
Opponents of the doctrine have pursued two lines of attack that focus
particularly on groundwater. Following the pattern observed previously, the first
line of attack argues that groundwater should not be regulated, even when it
poses a threat to protected surface resources, whereas the second argues that
groundwater should not be reserved as a protected resource in its own right.177
Both arguments have been almost uniformly unsuccessful, but progress has been
slow.
169
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700, 702 (implying reserved rights only where the primary purpose of the
reservation would be “entirely defeated” without the rights).
170
See Blumm, supra note 161, § 37.01(b)(3) (asserting the Supreme Court has “strictly construed the
scope of non-Indian reserved rights” and “state courts have recognized them and quantified them”).
171
Id. § 37.01(a.01) (describing reserved rights as “one of the most controversial aspects of water law,
especially in the arid West where federal lands predominate”).
172
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)
(recognizing reserved tribal fishing rights based on express language of treaty).
173
Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
174
Id. at 566–67.
175
Id. at 570, 576.
176
Id. at 576.
177
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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a. Groundwater as Threat
First, in the 1976 litigation Cappaert v. United States, state groundwater
users argued that even if the federal government could enjoin surface diversions
that negatively impacted federal reserved water rights, it had no such recourse
against harmful groundwater pumping.178 In response, the United States
grounded its defense in hydrologic reality and congressional intent, arguing that
“[g]round water and surface water are interlocking resources . . . and should be
treated similarly by the law” and that “it should not matter whether the water
reserved for a federal use is interfered with by a surface diversion or by a well.
The effect on the reserved land (no water available for its use) and the diverter
(obtaining the use of water previously spoken for) is the same.”179 The Supreme
Court agreed with the United States, concluding “since the implied-reservationof-water-rights doctrine is based on the necessity of water for the purpose of the
federal reservation, we hold that the United States can protect its waters from
subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or groundwater.”180
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly clarified that groundwater can be
regulated under the doctrine if its use threatens a protected surface supply.181
b. Groundwater as Protected Resource
As a second groundwater exclusion strategy, state water users have claimed
that federal reserved rights cannot attach to groundwater itself. This argument
has found purchase before only the Wyoming Supreme Court, but with little
analysis.182 The Wyoming court acknowledged that “[t]he logic which supports
a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also
supports reservation of groundwater,” but declined to do so in that case because
the litigants had not cited a single precedent applying the doctrine to
178
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). The federal government reserved water rights in a pool
deep within a limestone cavern to protect the habitat of the rare desert pupfish, then believed to exist nowhere
else in the world. Id. at 131, 133–34. The Court classified the pool as surface water rather than groundwater
(although not entirely free from ambiguity) and enjoined groundwater pumpers some two and a half miles away
who lowered water levels in the pool. Id. at 133, 142–43; Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12,
20, 22–24, Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128 (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304) (arguing against regulation of groundwater
pumping); id. at 45 (arguing that “[e]ven if the government were held to have sufficient reserved rights to protect
the pupfish, it should not follow that they are entitled to completely preempt all other uses in the underground
aquifer which jeopardize the designated water level in the Hole”).
179
Brief for the United States at 31, Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128 (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304).
180
Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 143.
181
Id.
182
In re Gen. Adjudication of the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d by an equally
divided court sub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), abrogated by Vaughn v. State, 962
P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998).
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groundwater.183 Despite the thin analysis, in 1989 the U.S. Supreme Court
accepted certiorari and affirmed by an equally divided court without opinion.184
Every other lower court to subsequently address the issue has held to the
contrary, including the Arizona Supreme Court185 and the Montana Supreme
Court.186 Most recently, in 2017 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that
groundwater can be the basis of a reserved right. In Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District, the Ninth Circuit squarely
held that the reserved water rights doctrine applies to groundwater.187
Reconciling the on-the-ground reality that surface water is “virtually
nonexistent” on the reserved lands with the congressional intent to secure
permanent homes for tribal members with “land and water enough,” the Court
determined that the tribe’s survival “is conditioned on access to water” and “a
reservation without an adequate source of surface water must be able to access
groundwater.”188 Building on Cappaert, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[i]f
the United States can protect against groundwater diversions, it follows that it
can protect the groundwater itself.”189 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari,
leaving intact the Agua Caliente tribe’s rights to the groundwater beneath its
reservation land,190 despite the high court’s previous affirmance of a decision to

183
Id. at 99–100 (holding that “the reserved water rights doctrine does not extend to groundwater” and
declining to review the district court’s determination that Wyoming “owns” the groundwater beneath its
territory).
184
Wyoming, 492 U.S. 406 (per curiam).
185
In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rts. to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 747–
50 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that “[t]he significant question for the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine is not
whether the water runs above or below the ground but whether it is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the
reservation”), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000).
186
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Rsrv. v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093, 1099, 1101
(Mont. 2002) (finding “no reason to limit the scope of our prior holdings by excluding groundwater from the
Tribes’ federally reserved water rights in this case” and enjoining state agency from issuing competing water
use permits until tribes’ reserved rights have been quantified); see also Tweedy v. Tex. Co., 286 F. Supp. 383,
385 (D. Mont. 1968) (opining that “whether the waters were found on the surface of land or under it should
make no difference” to the reservation of water rights to make arid lands useful, but finding insufficient evidence
that surface landowners within Indian reservation had been deprived of valid reserved rights by defendants’
water use in that case).
187
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1267, 1270
(9th Cir. 2017) (resolving only the first phase of trifurcated litigation and stating “while we are unable to find
controlling federal appellate authority explicitly holding that the Winters doctrine applies to groundwater, we
now expressly hold that it does”), cert. denied sub nom. Coachella Valley Water Dist. v. Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians, 138 S. Ct. 468 (2017).
188
Id. at 1265–66, 1271.
189
Id. at 1271.
190
Coachella Valley Water Dist., 138 S. Ct. 468.
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the contrary by the Wyoming Supreme Court.191 These opinions have potential
ramifications for hundreds of other tribes across the country.192
3. The Rationales
In their attempts to exclude groundwater from the reserved rights doctrine,
states and their water users relied on largely discredited assertions imported from
intrastate water rights litigation:193 Well pumpers own the groundwater beneath
their land;194 the movement of groundwater is too unknown to be regulated;195
groundwater moves too slowly to affect surface use;196 “percolating”
groundwater is not connected to surface waters;197 the federal government
should bear the burden of proving that the groundwater pumping impacts surface
reserved rights;198 and the use of water for federal purposes interferes with the
policy of promoting the maximum utilization of waters within the state.199 In
contrast to such arguments, the Supreme Court has relied on the functional
connectivity of surface water and groundwater, as well as on doctrinal
purpose,200 in support of the regulation of groundwater that affects protected
surface reserved rights. These rationales highlight the path forward toward the
integration of surface water and groundwater.

191

See supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.4.
193
See supra Part II.A.3.
194
See United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 318 (9th Cir. 1974) (summarizing and rejecting
defendants’ argument that they held ownership rights to underground water that could only be taken from them
by eminent domain), aff’d, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12–13, 24–31, Desert Water
Agency v. Agua Caliente of Cahulla Indians, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017) (No. 17-42) (arguing that the priority rule
does not apply to groundwater); In re Gen. Adjudication of the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 99–100 (Wyo.
1988) (holding that “the reserved water rights doctrine does not extend to groundwater” and declining to review
the district court’s determination that Wyoming “owns” the groundwater beneath its territory), aff’d by an
equally divided court sub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), abrogated by Vaughn v. State,
962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998).
195
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128 (Nos. 74-1107, 74-1304)
(arguing “[t]he existence of feasible groundwater supplies, especially in the early days, was not known” and
therefore the United States could not have formed the intent to reserve such groundwater).
196
Brief for Intervenor-Appellant State of Nevada at 27–29, Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128 (Nos. 74-1107, 741304).
197
See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 195, at 24.
198
Id. at 6.
199
Id. at 8.
200
See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text.
192
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4. The Consequences
Groundwater exceptionalism impacts who can use water. It favors well
pumpers over surface diverters under state water rights law201 and potentially
benefits water users in one state over another in interstate disputes.202 In the
context of reserved water rights, unchecked exceptionalism could impede water
use by yet another group—Native Americans, almost half of whom lack
sufficient access to drinking water on tribal reservations.203 Currently, more than
two hundred western tribes occupy lands with groundwater rights that have not
yet been quantified by courts or through negotiated agreements.204 Because
many of those tribes occupy arid lands with relatively little surface water,
deprivation of groundwater access would threaten the tribes’ very existence.205
Forestalling just such a consequence, courts have broadly resisted the exception
of groundwater from federal reserved rights.
Excluding groundwater from the reserved rights doctrine would impact not
only who can use water, but also the purposes for which scarce resources should
be allocated. Federal lands are concentrated disproportionately in the arid
West,206 where groundwater is often more available than surface supplies.
Depriving federal reservations of reserved rights in groundwater could make
significantly less water available for federal purposes, which focus heavily on
preservation as a counterweight to the development uses often favored by state
water users.207
C. Interstate Water Allocation
Just as individual water users compete on an intrastate basis, so also do states
battle with one another for the right to use interstate water resources.
Historically, most of these disputes focused on surface water, and the law has

201

See supra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.C.2.
203
Josie Garthwaite, Stanford Study Reveals the Changing Scope of Native American Groundwater
Rights—And Opportunities for Better Freshwater Management, STAN. NEWS, https://news.stanford.edu/2018/
08/03/who-owns-the-aquifer/ (Aug. 3, 2018) (observing “[a]lmost half of all homes on Native American land
lack adequate access to drinking water or waste disposal facilities, compared to less than 1 percent for U.S.
homes overall”).
204
To supply water needs in the absence of settled water rights, some tribes have purchased water from
local water supply agencies, which depend upon state water rights rather than federal reserved rights. Id.
205
See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
206
The federal government owns approximately fifty percent of the land in the western states. Candace H.
Stowell, Federal Lands in the West: A Few Facts and Figures, W. PLANNER (Apr./May 2016), https://www.
westernplanner.org/201604issue/2017/8/9/federal-lands-in-the-west-a-few-facts-and-figures.
207
See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 954–55.
202

KLEIN_1.31.22

522

1/31/2022 3:00 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:487

made steady progress toward integrating some hydrologically connected
groundwater into such surface allocations.208 However, the law has been slower
to allocate interstate groundwater independently of any impacts it might have on
surface rivers and streams: It was not until the 2021 decision in Mississippi v.
Tennessee that the U.S. Supreme Court held that the equitable apportionment
doctrine could be applied to qualifying groundwater aquifers, although it did not
do so under the facts of that particular case.209 As one treatise notes, there are
“scores of productive aquifers” that span state lines or form state boundaries,
giving rise to “immense” potential for “enormous controversy.”210 Overall, these
developments fit the pattern observed in the context of federal reserved water
rights, under which the law regulates groundwater that threatens protected
surface rights long before it protects or regulates the groundwater supply
itself.211
1. The Law
There are three primary mechanisms for the resolution of disagreements over
transboundary waters. First, the states can come to an agreement through socalled “interstate compacts,” which must be ratified by Congress.212
Alternatively, the U.S. Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes
between the states involving water.213 To resolve such disputes, the Court has
developed a body of federal common law known as “equitable apportionment,”
which calls for awarding each rival an “equality of right,” but not necessarily an
equal volume of water.214 The Court has been stinting in its willingness to
apportion disputed waters.215 As of 2021, it has decreed an apportionment of
only three interstate rivers (although one additional case arguably might be
interpreted as an apportionment).216 In seven other cases, the Court has
208

See infra Part II.C.2.a.
See infra notes 239–47 and accompanying text.
210
Douglas L. Grant & Bret C. Birdsong, Introduction to Interstate Allocation Problems, in 3 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 43.01 n.1 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d. ed. 2021).
211
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
212
Grant & Birdsong, supra note 210, § 43.02. Less directly, differences can also be resolved through
private suits between individual water users in different states, state regulation of interstate water exports, and
perhaps through state agreements that fall short of interstate compact status. Id.
213
Id. §§ 45.01, 45.02.
214
Id. § 45.01 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907)).
215
Burke W. Griggs, Interstate Litigation, State Reaction, and Federalism in the Age of Groundwater, in
65 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. PROC. 26-1, 26-2–26-3 (2019) [hereinafter Griggs, Interstate Litigation]
(explaining that judicial equitable apportionment is a less common method of allocating interstate water
supplies).
216
Douglas L. Grant & Bret C. Birdsong, Equitable Apportionment Suits Between States, in 3 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 45.07 nn.356–58 & 359–82 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d. ed. 2021). Those rivers include the
209
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dismissed apportionment petitions on a variety of grounds.217 As a third and final
dispute resolution method, Congress can also apportion interstate waters
directly, but it has exercised that authority so rarely as to be of negligible
importance to the analysis that follows.218
2. The Exceptions
a. Interstate Compacts
Most often, states settle disputes by negotiating interstate compacts, which
following: (1) the Laramie River: Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (apportionment); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 353 U.S. 953 (1957) (replacing previous decree); (2) the Delaware River: New Jersey v. New York,
283 U.S. 336 (1931) (apportionment); New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954) (modified decree); and (3)
the North Platte River: Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (apportionment); Nebraska v. Wyoming,
534 U.S. 40 (2001) (modified decree); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (allowing Nebraska to
proceed on a claim that Wyoming’s upstream groundwater withdrawals substantially deplete apportioned surface
waters). One might also consider the Court’s treatment of yet a fourth river—the Gila River (a tributary of the
Colorado River)—as a type of apportionment between Arizona and New Mexico. See Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 594–95 (1963). The Court explained the following:
Arizona and New Mexico presented the Master with conflicting claims to water in the Gila River,
the tributary that rises in New Mexico and flows through Arizona. Having determined that tributaries are not within the regulatory provisions of the Project Act[,] the Master held that this interstate dispute should be decided under the principles of equitable apportionment . . . [and accepted
a compromise settlement agreed upon by these states]. No exceptions have been filed to these
recommendations by any of the parties and they are accordingly accepted by us.
Id.
217
To date, the Court has accepted, but later dismissed or failed to resolve, actions to apportion the
following seven rivers: (1) the Arkansas River: Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 114–15, 117–18 (1907)
(dismissing complaint without prejudice and rejecting Kansas’s contention that “underflow” should be treated
as a separate river with the same course as the surface Arkansas River); (2) the Connecticut River: Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931) (dismissing complaint because Connecticut failed to satisfy its burden of
proof); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 283 U.S. 789 (1931) (dismissing complaint); (3) the Walla Walla River:
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936) (confirming special master’s recommendation to dismiss
Washington’s request for apportionment of the Walla Walla River and finding Oregon’s groundwater use
reasonable under the facts of the case); (4) the Colorado River: Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936)
(denying petition for leave to file complaint for failure to join United States as indispensable party); (5) the
Vermejo River: Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) (dismissing the case); (6) the Catawba River:
South Carolina v. North Carolina: 552 U.S. 804 (2007) (granting motion for leave to file complaint; the case
was later settled); and (7) the Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint Rivers Basin: Florida v. Georgia, 141 S.
Ct. 1175 (2021) (dismissing the case for Florida’s failure to prove serious injury by clear and convincing
evidence). In yet an eighth case, the Court held that equitable apportionment applied to a disputed underground
aquifer, but dismissed the complaint without reaching an apportionment because plaintiff Mississippi had never
specifically requested such remedy. See Mississippi v. Tennessee, 595 U.S. __, slip op. at 6, 11–12 (Nov. 22,
2021) (dismissing complaint and declining to decide whether Mississippi should be granted leave to amend its
complaint to request an equitable apportionment); see also infra notes 239–47 and accompanying text
(discussing Mississippi v. Tennessee).
218
Grant & Birdsong, supra note 210, § 47.01 (noting the Supreme Court has recognized only two
congressional apportionments, both of which “grew out of unusual circumstances”).
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become federal law upon receiving congressional consent.219 As of the end of
2020, there were twenty-three water apportionment compacts, only four of
which specifically mention groundwater.220 One of those four compacts
references groundwater only to explicitly exclude it from the apportionment.221
The remaining three compacts also exclude groundwater from apportionment,
unless it is tributary or causes a measurable depletion to surface flows.222 This
widespread failure to apportion groundwater is perhaps unsurprising: Many
interstate compacts had been negotiated by the mid-twentieth century, before the
advent of the groundwater revolution.223
By the mid-twentieth century, a dramatic increase of groundwater pumping
threatened to upset carefully crafted compact allocations of surface waters.224
The stakes were quite high, involving thousands of post-compact wells that
potentially depleted surface rivers in defiance of a state’s compact obligations.225
States turned to the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether compact
restrictions encompassed both surface and underground water, even if the
original agreements failed to specifically mention “groundwater.” To date, the
Court has interpreted five compacts silent on groundwater to determine whether
219
Id. §§ 46.01–.02; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”). The Supreme Court has expressed its
preference for this method of interstate allocation. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943)
(calling for “judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of States” and asserting that “mutual
accommodation and agreement [through compact] should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of
invocation of [the Court’s] adjudicatory power”).
220
Grant & Birdsong, supra note 210, §§ 46.01, 46.03. In addition to those twenty-three compacts, several
others interstate agreements involve partial apportionments or indirectly affect water allocation. Id.
221
Id. § 46.03; see Klamath River Basin Compact of 1957, art. II (defining “water” or “waters” as water
“on the surface of the ground in streams, lakes or otherwise, regardless of whether such waters at any time were
or will become ground water, but shall not include water extracted from underground sources until after such
water is used and becomes surface return flow or waste water”).
222
Amended Bear River Compact arts. V(A), VI(B), 94 Stat. 4, 10–11 (1980) (regulating the withdrawal
of groundwater “tributary” to the Bear River, as measured by the resultant “annual depletion” to the River);
Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact art. V(5.2), 86 Stat. 193, 196–97 (1972) (limiting groundwater
regulation to withdrawals from wells drilled after November 1, 1968 into the “alluvium and valley side terrace
deposits within one mile” from the river, provided such regulation yields “measurable increases” in surface flow
at the state line); Upper Niobrara River Compact art. IV(A), 83 Stat. 86, 87, 89 (1969) (providing for potential
future regulation of wells that deplete surface river flows, where apportionment of groundwater is determined to
be desirable or necessary).
223
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
224
Griggs, Interstate Litigation, supra note 215, at 26-9 (noting “the groundwater revolution started to
undermine the compact administration of many interstate basins”); Leshy, supra note 2, at 1475 (documenting
the increase of groundwater pumping from thirty-eight to almost ninety-four million acre-feet between 1950 and
2000).
225
Griggs, A Fifty-Year Retrospective, supra note 11, at 171–72 (describing Kansas’s allegations that
Nebraska countenanced the drilling of thousands of wells in the Republican River Basin, which depleted surface
flows previously allocated by compact to downstream Kansas).
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they nevertheless authorize the restriction of well pumping that threatens rivers
previously allocated: (1) the Rio Grande Compact of 1938; (2) the Republican
River Compact of 1943; (3) the Arkansas River Compact of 1949; (4) the Pecos
River Compact of 1949; and (5) the Yellowstone River Compact of 1951.226
In revisiting these mid-twentieth century agreements, the Court held that
each of the five challenged compacts constrains groundwater use, at least to the
extent that it causes depletions to surface streams the compacts were designed
to apportion—a functional approach that advances the compacts’ goals of
dividing up surface waters.227 Further, the Court devised stringent new remedies
in an effort to deter future compact breaches.228 At times, the Court and the
special masters that assisted it sometimes fell back on old terminology from state
water rights law, interpreting the compacts broadly enough to regulate
groundwater that qualified as “tributary” or “subflow,” or that formed
“underground streams.”229 But more importantly, the rulings consistently
recognized the interconnectedness of surface and underground supplies,230

226
Douglas L. Grant & Bret C. Birdsong, Interpretation and Enforcement, in 3 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 46.05 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2021) (identifying compacts interpreted by the Court on a range of
issues, including some considering the extent of authority over groundwater).
227
See Griggs, A Fifty-Year Retrospective, supra note 11, at 179–80 (summarizing results of compact
interpretation litigation as “firmly incorporat[ing] groundwater into compacts that had been negotiated and
enacted decades before large-scale groundwater pumping greatly expanded water usage across their respective
basins”).
228
See, e.g., Chad O. Dorr, “Unless and Until It Proves to be Necessary”: Applying Water Interest to
Prevent Unjust Enrichment in Interstate Water Disputes, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1763, 1766–67, 1788–91 (2013)
(discussing groundbreaking remedies imposed by special master against New Mexico for likely deliberate
circumvention of its compact obligations to Texas, including placing the burden of proof on New Mexico to
prove its groundwater pumping had not violated the compact; awarding damages with post-judgment interest;
and requiring in-kind damage payments of water, not money; but noting that the Supreme Court gave New
Mexico the option of paying either water damages or monetary damages); Joshua Mann, Saving Water in the
Pecos: One Coin, Two Sides, Many Overdrafts (and No Bail Outs?), 47 IDAHO L. REV. 341, 355–56 (2011)
(describing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983) as “the first major interstate lawsuit . . . involving the
legal relationship between groundwater and surface water”).
229
See, e.g., First Interim Report of the Special Master at 43, 44, 47, Montana v. Wyoming & North
Dakota, No. 137, Orig. (Feb. 10, 2010) (finding compact restricted the pumping of “at least some groundwater
withdrawals,” potentially including such categories as “underground streams,” the “subflow of a stream,” and
“percolations tributary to watercourses”); Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 373–74 (2011) (citing special
master’s uncontested finding that the compact protects certain existing appropriations in Montana from “new
surface and groundwater diversions in Wyoming . . . that prevent adequate water from reaching Montana to
satisfy those [protected levels of] appropriations”); see also Griggs, supra note 215, at 26–18 (discussing special
master’s conclusion that Yellowstone River Compact protected Montana’s surface share from the pumping of
hydrologically connected groundwater).
230
Griggs, Interstate Litigation, supra note 215, at 26-10 (describing how the Court “consistently ruled”
that hydrologically connected groundwater falls within the scope of interstate compacts and equitable
apportionments, even if compacts fail to specifically address groundwater).
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marking a sharp departure from many states’ exclusion of groundwater from
intrastate water rights regulated under state law.231
b. Equitable Apportionment
To date, the Supreme Court has engaged in three equitable
apportionments.232 As with interstate compacts, those efforts focused primarily
on the allocation of competing states’ shares of surface rivers, but tangentially
included some tributary groundwater that impacted the flow of those rivers.233
One recent case went further to potentially integrate groundwater into the
allocation, but stopped short of decreeing an equitable apportionment: In Florida
v. Georgia, Florida sought an equitable apportionment of all waters
“hydrologically” connected to two named surface rivers, “including, without
limitation, groundwater, rivers, streams, creeks, draws, and drainages.”234
Florida complained broadly about its neighbor’s groundwater pumping—
potentially sweeping the water used to irrigate hundreds of thousands of acres
of Georgia farmland into its requested apportionment.235 The Court was
unconvinced that Florida had demonstrated sufficient harm to justify an
apportionment and dismissed the litigation.236 However, it accepted without
criticism the broad scope of groundwater analysis contained in the special
master’s first report,237 which could serve as a template for future equitable
apportionment litigation.

231

See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
233
Grant & Birdsong, supra note 210, § 45.01 (noting “[a]lthough groundwater was, or perhaps was,
involved in a few of these [apportionment] cases, the Court has not explicitly extended the equitable
apportionment doctrine to interstate groundwater, though it might do so on proper facts”).
234
Complaint for Equitable Apportionment and Injunctive Relief at 6, Florida v. Georgia, No. 142, Orig.
(Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/special-master-142 (emphasis added).
235
Id. at 8–9 (referring to the Flint River Basin as “the source of water for hundreds of thousands of acres
of irrigated land in southern Georgia, most of which is served by irrigation wells”); id. at 16 (complaining about
Georgia’s irrigation of up to 843,000 acres of farmland, an area described as “larger than the State of Rhode
Island”).
236
Florida v. Georgia, 141 S. Ct. 1175, 1183 (2021) (holding that Florida failed to sustain the burden of
proving serious harm caused by Georgia’s alleged water overconsumption).
237
Report of Special Master Ralph Lancaster, Jr., at 31–34, Florida v. Georgia, No. 142, Orig. (Feb. 14,
2017) (noting “largely unrestrained” agricultural irrigation in Georgia); Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502,
2509, 2525 (2018) (remanding to special master to determine whether a cap on Georgia’s agricultural water
consumption in the Flint River basin would produce enough extra water reaching the Apalachicola River to
significantly redress the economic and ecological harm that Florida had suffered). On remand, the special master
recommended dismissing Florida’s complaint, but raised no doubts that groundwater use had appropriately
figured in his weighing of the potential benefits and harms of an apportionment. Report of Special Master Paul
J. Kelly, Jr., at 25, 80, Florida v. Georgia, No. 142, Orig. (Dec. 11, 2019).
232
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Beyond this expanding regulation of groundwater usage that threatens
allocated surface waters, in 2021 the Supreme Court unanimously held, as a
matter of first impression, that interstate aquifers can be protected resources
worthy of allocation in their own right.238 In Mississippi v. Tennessee,
Mississippi filed a sweeping claim in 2014: that it “owns” all the groundwater
that had been beneath its territory at the time it entered the Union in 1817.239 To
bolster its claim, Mississippi argued that in some portions of the aquifer the
groundwater moves as slowly as one inch per day and therefore is “part of the
earth” that would never under natural conditions be available beneath
Tennessee.240 Further, Mississippi complained that Tennessee had wrongfully
siphoned off its water through a well field just across the state line.241 Mississippi
adamantly resisted sharing the groundwater through an equitable
apportionment;242 instead, it sought more than a half billion dollars in damages
for the alleged theft of its groundwater.243
In an earlier phase of the litigation, the Fifth Circuit had held that the dispute
fell “squarely within the original development and application of the equitable
apportionment doctrine” and explained that “[t]he fact that this particular water
source is located underground . . . is of no analytical significance. The Aquifer
flows, if slowly, under several states, and it is indistinguishable from a lake
bordered by multiple states or from a river bordering several states depending
upon it for water.”244 Citing the Fifth Circuit’s statement with approval, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that equitable apportionment of the disputed aquifer would
be “‘sufficiently similar’ to past applications of the doctrine [to surface rivers

238
See supra note 56 (revealing inconsistent treatment of groundwater as threat vs. groundwater as
protected resource).
239
Mississippi’s Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 3–6, 8–10 [hereinafter Mississippi
Complaint] (complaining disputed groundwater pumped in Tennessee “is a valuable natural resource belonging
to Mississippi which would have never, under natural conditions, resided or been available within Tennessee’s
boundaries”), Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 143, Orig., 2014 WL 5319728 (June 6, 2014). See generally Klein,
Owning Groundwater, supra note 3, at 474 (discussing litigation history between Mississippi and Tennessee).
240
Mississippi Complaint, supra note 239; see also Transcript of Closing Argument at 9–10, Mississippi
v. Tennessee, No. 143, Orig. (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/sites/ca6/files/documents/special_
master/No.%20131%20Transcript%20of%20Closing%20Arguments.pdf (Mississippi arguing that extremely
slow-moving groundwater “is part of the earth” and owned by Mississippi).
241
Mississippi Complaint, supra note 239, at 5.
242
Id. at 17–19 (arguing “Mississippi should not be . . . forced to ‘share’ its natural resources . . . under a
claim by Tennessee to a right of equitable apportionment”).
243
Id. at 21 (estimating “the value of the Mississippi groundwater . . . wrongfully taken,” combined with
prejudgment interest, as at least $615 million).
244
Hood ex. rel. Mississippi v. Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding the disputed
aquifer “is an interstate water source, and the amount of water to which each state is entitled from a disputed
interstate water source must be allocated before one state may sue an entity for invading its share”).
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and streams] to warrant the same treatment.”245 Taking care to “resist general
propositions” in a matter of first impression, the Court narrowly held that the
particular groundwater at issue was subject to equitable apportionment because,
as the special master had found, the aquifer and its water had the hallmarks of
an interstate resource, even though it flowed extremely slowly.246 The Court
forcefully rejected Mississippi’s contention that it had “sovereign ownership of
all groundwater beneath its surface,” observing that such an approach would
defeat doctrinal purpose by “allow[ing] an upstream State to completely cut off
flow to a downstream one, a result contrary to our equitable apportionment
jurisprudence.”247
3. The Rationales
In support of their right to use groundwater unfettered by compact or
apportionment, some states have resurrected the same exceptionalism arguments
advanced by well pumpers in the context of intrastate water rights:248
Groundwater is part of the soil and owned by the overlying landowner;249
groundwater use is too complicated to be regulated;250 and states should
encourage the maximum beneficial use of water.251
But courts have been less tolerant of such arguments in the interstate context
and have swept them away with a variety of explanations that can point the way
forward to integrated water use throughout the hydrologic cycle.252 First, courts
have been impatient with feigned hydrologic ignorance, noting that scientists
have understood the connection between surface water and groundwater since
well before the mid-twentieth century.253 In addition, courts have resisted
245

Mississippi v. Tennessee, 595 U.S. __, slip op. at 4, 7–8 (Nov. 22, 2021).
Id. at 9–10. Among the hallmarks making the disputed water susceptible to apportionment, the Court
noted that the aquifer’s geologic formation was a “transboundary resource,” that it contained water that “flows
naturally between the states,” and that the challenged pumping within Tennessee had interstate effects. Id. at 8–
9. Further, the Court rejected Mississippi’s argument that the slow speed of the flow precluded apportionment,
observing that “we have long applied equitable apportionment even to streams that run dry from time to time.”
Id. at 8 (noting that even though the subject groundwater flowed at a rate of only one or two inches daily, that
amounted to “over 10 billion gallons per year” flowing across the state line).
247
Id. at 9–10.
248
See infra Part II.A.3.
249
See, e.g., supra note 240 (argument of Mississippi against neighboring Tennessee).
250
See, e.g., Report of Special Master Vincent L. McKuisick at 41–43, Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado,
No. 126, Orig. (Jan. 28, 2000) (disapprovingly recounting Colorado’s argument that compact drafters intended
to exclude certain groundwater pumping from compact’s allocation restrictions because of “the complexity of
quantifying the hydraulic connection” between groundwater pumping and streamflow depletion).
251
See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
252
See infra Part III.C.
253
See, e.g., Report of Special Master at 23, Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, supra note 250 (observing
246
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attempts to treat groundwater as part of the surface estate, even if the water’s
movement is so slow as to be nearly imperceptible.254 Likewise, they have
rejected the notion that administrative difficulty excuses groundwater regulation
under interstate compacts.255 Overall, the courts have taken a pragmatic,
functional approach that is faithful to doctrinal purpose, opining that early
negotiators surely intended to restrict groundwater use that interfered with
allocations of surface streams, even if the relevant documents lack explicit
references to “groundwater.”256
4. The Consequences
In the intrastate context, exceptionalism has insulated groundwater pumpers
from regulation to such an extent that they have developed a distinct political
subculture that threatens the very foundations of the prior appropriation
doctrine.257 State courts have had little appetite for reining in groundwater use
and impeding what they view as the maximum beneficial use of the states’ water
resources.258 But when the federal courts have been called on to mediate between
the states, they have been much more willing to restrict groundwater use,
particularly when states hide behind the cloak of exceptionalism while using
more than their share of apportioned watercourses. In the interstate context, the
seemingly laudatory mantra of “maximum use” potentially furnishes a license
to evade a state’s solemn responsibilities imposed by a congressionallyapproved compact or a Court-crafted equitable apportionment.

the “connection between groundwater discharge and stream flow was a widely known scientific fact well before
the [Republican River] Compact was drafted” in 1943).
254
See supra note 246 and accompanying text (Supreme Court’s rejection of claim that slow movement
of groundwater can preclude application of equitable apportionment doctrine); see also Report of Special Master
at 24–26, Mississippi v. Tennessee, supra note 246 and accompanying text (concluding that disputed
groundwater is an interstate resource subject to apportionment because of at least some interstate natural flow,
no matter how slowly it moves); Transcript of Closing Argument at 65, 70–71, Hood ex. rel. Mississippi v.
Tennessee, supra note 240 (City of Memphis arguing that the Supreme Court has never used a “speed limit or
residence time” to decide whether a resource is interstate and subject to apportionment).
255
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
256
See, e.g., Report of Special Master, Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, supra note 250, at 21–23
(explaining the language of the compact is clearly broad enough to include the effects of groundwater pumping,
despite the absence of the term “groundwater,” and concluding the broad purposes of the compact indicated that
the parties could not have intended that one state could “unilaterally enlarge” its allocation by taking
hydraulically connected groundwater before it reached the stream flow); see also Special Master’s Report, supra
note 229, at 19–20 (interpreting compact’s purpose to “remove all causes of present and future controversy” as
broad enough to protect established water rights from later initiated surface and groundwater uses); supra note
247 and accompanying text (the Supreme Court’s rejection of an attempt to thwart the purpose of equitable
apportionment in Mississippi v. Tennessee).
257
See Griggs, Water: Practical Challenges, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
258
See supra notes 136 & 138 and accompanying text.
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Several practical consequences have followed from this judicial pushback,
particularly in cases of willful breach. Courts have expanded the scope of
remedies that can be imposed to deter such water brinkmanship by one state at
the expense of another, including retroactive liability, in-kind payments through
water “disgorgements,” and the charging of monetary interest for the period of
noncompliance.259 Relatedly, courts have assigned the noncomplying state with
the burden of proving that its groundwater use will not violate a previously
negotiated compact.260 Tougher judicial remedies, in turn, have given states the
motivation and political cover necessary to regulate some groundwater usage on
their own—an effort that could amount to “political suicide” in the absence of
an external compulsive force such as judicial oversight, but one that may prove
increasingly necessary in the face of climate change.261 In addition, judicial
recognition of the interconnectedness of surface and underground water has
created an incentive for the development of sophisticated hydrogeologic
computer models that shed light on the impacts of well pumping on other water
users, even though distant in time or geography.262 Although powerful, such
consequences have not brought about the coordinated treatment of surface water
and groundwater at the interstate level.263 Some states continue to make the
strategic, political calculation that the benefits of exceeding their allocated share
exceed the costs and potential penalties, a hydrologic version of contract law’s
“efficient breach” calculation.264

259
See Griggs, A Fifty-Year Retrospective, supra note 11, at 190–94 (discussing the deterrent effect of
imposing damages for breach of compact).
260
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
261
See Griggs, A Fifty-Year Retrospective, supra note 11, at 166, 214–16 (discussing the fundamental
reform of Kansas water law integrating surface and groundwater use prompted by Court’s previous
apportionment decisions). See generally Ellen M. Gilmer & Jennifer Kay, Water Wars at the Supreme Court:
“It’s Only Going to Get Worse,” BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 17, 2020, 1:16 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
environment-and-energy/water-wars-at-the-supreme-court-its-only-going-to-get-worse (“As climate change
increases droughts and makes surface water increasingly scarce, . . . groundwater is where cities and states are
increasingly turning for their water resources.” (quoting Professor Robert Percival)).
262
See Griggs, A Fifty-Year Retrospective, supra note 11, at 180–81.
263
See id. at 181.
264
As Professor Griggs explains, “Time and again, the economic benefits of groundwater pumping have
led states to disobey their compact obligations rather than to make the politically unpopular decision to reduce
pumping.” Because the wronged state will have to spend considerable time and money in protecting its allocation
through enforcement litigation, the disobeying state’s overpumping can represent “sound cost-benefit analysis”
because even if “a plaintiff state eventually prevails, the defendant state has almost certainly reaped the economic
benefits obtained from water over-consumption prior to the lawsuit and even during its pendency.” Id. at 168–
70, 190; see id. at 169 n.116 (citing Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015), for the
Court’s awareness that “the economic incentives for Nebraska to withhold water owed to Kansas, pay resulting
damages, and still come out ahead are a ‘recipe for breach’”).
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D. The Clean Water Act
In contrast to the allocation of water rights under state law, the regulation of
water pollution is controlled primarily by the federal Clean Water Act of 1972
(CWA).265 The CWA calls for hydrologic “integrity” by declaring the sweeping
purpose “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation’s waters.”266 The statute assigns primary regulatory responsibility
to federal agencies and authorizes them to oversee various permit programs
established by the statute.267 The CWA includes a savings clause that preserves
to the states primary responsibility to “prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution”
and to engage in land and water planning.268 Commentators disagree as to the
impact of this clause: groundwater exceptionalists hail it as a core component of
the CWA that constrains federal regulation,269 whereas critics, such as Professor
Oliver Houck, describe it as a “beguiling” and “misleading” relic from past
approaches to water pollution long since abandoned by Congress.270
History aside, state programs often are “nonregulatory” in the sense that they
rely on voluntary compliance rather than strict enforcement mechanisms.271
Thus, the invocation of federalism principles can serve as a proxy for the goal
of minimizing regulation.272 Much has been written about the regulatory divide
between “point source” pollution (subject to federal control) and “nonpoint
source” pollution (left to state oversight).273 But, as relevant to this Article, some
have drawn a line between surface water and groundwater that purportedly
265
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
266
Id. § 1251(a) (emphasis added).
267
See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
268
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
269
See, e.g., Damien Schiff, Keeping the Clean Water Act Cooperatively Federal—Or, Why the Clean
Water Act Does Not Directly Regulate Groundwater Pollution, 42 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 447,
455 (2019) (article by senior attorney for the Pacific Legal Foundation arguing that Congress left to the states
the authority “to regulate (or not to regulate) the addition of any pollutant to things other than ‘navigable waters,’
or the addition of any pollutant from a ‘nonpoint source’”).
270
Oliver A. Houck, Cooperative Federalism, Nutrients, and the Clean Water Act: Three Cases Revisited,
44 ENV’T L. REP. 10426, 10427–28 (2014) (concluding the CWA “relegates to the states a highly circumscribed
role for those dischargers most on the national mind in 1972” and arguing that “[state] primacy was exactly what
Congress rejected” when enacting the CWA).
271
See, e.g., Schiff, supra note 269, at 454 (noting significant civil and criminal liability under some
provisions of the CWA); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
“Section 319 does not require states to penalize nonpoint source polluters who fail to adopt best management
practices; rather it provides for grants to encourage the adoption of such practices”).
272
See Schiff, supra note 269 (asserting states have authority to decline to regulate pollution beyond
federal jurisdiction).
273
See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479 (1989).
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demarcates the respective roles of federal and state authorities. As this section
shows, it has become increasingly untenable to square extra-scientific, brightline legal rules with the nuanced reality of the hydrologic cycle.
Those seeking to narrow the statute’s regulatory reach have identified
groundwater as a prime target, with mixed results. Although the law remains in
considerable disarray, two opposing patterns have begun to take shape.274 Courts
and federal agencies have been reluctant to recognize groundwater as a protected
resource in its own right under federal law. This reluctance has taken the form
of the broad exclusion of groundwater from regulatory definitions of “waters of
the United States”—the statutory phrase that describes the jurisdictional scope
of the CWA.275 In contrast, courts have been increasingly willing to regulate
groundwater that threatens to pollute jurisdictional surface waters. In 2020, the
U.S. Supreme Court issued a path-breaking opinion, holding that the CWA
regulates discharges of pollutants into groundwater in cases where it poses a
sufficient threat to jurisdictional surface waters protected under the statute.276 In
so doing, the high court rebuffed exceptionalists’ attempt to create a glaring
loophole for pollution that travels any distance—however short—through
groundwater before contaminating protected surface water supplies.277
1. The Law
Reduced to basics, the CWA protects “navigable waters”278—a term of art
that has defied consistent interpretation over the years. To safeguard such
protected waters, the statute regulates activities that constitute the “discharge of
any pollutant”279—another term of art with an elusive meaning. These
jurisdictional limits apply widely to the entire statute, including the Section 402
pollutant discharge permit program, the Section 404 dredge and fill permit
program, and provisions regarding water quality standards, oil spill liability and
prevention, and enforcement.280

274
A similar pattern has appeared in the context of the federal reserved rights doctrine, see supra note 163
and accompanying text, and the allocation of interstate waters, see supra note 211 and accompanying text.
275
See infra Part II.D.2.
276
See infra Part II.D.2.b.
277
See infra note 335 and accompanying text.
278
See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (except pursuant to permit “the discharge of any pollutant
by any person shall be unlawful”); id. § 1362(12) (defining “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source”).
279
Id.
280
STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44585, EVOLUTION OF THE MEANING OF “WATERS OF
THE UNITED STATES” IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT 3 (2019) (discussing the broad applicability of the definition
of “navigable waters” throughout the CWA).
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2. The Exceptions
a. Protected Waters—The Scope of “Navigable Waters”
The CWA extends federal protection to “navigable waters,” which the
statute defines as “the waters of the United States” (WOTUS).281 The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps), agencies entrusted with administration of the CWA, have struggled to
define “waters of the United States” through a series of rulemakings.282 These
proceedings are politically charged and the outcomes have vacillated widely
with changes in presidential administration, often excluding groundwater from
their reach.
i. 1980 & 1982 Rules
The rules developed in three stages, and yet a fourth incarnation is currently
underway. First, under parallel definitions promulgated by the Corps and the
EPA in 1980 and 1982,283 the agencies interpreted federal jurisdiction to include
three categories of surface waters that roughly tracked the scope of the
Commerce Clause: (1) waters related to interstate or foreign commerce; (2)
interstate waters and wetlands; and (3) waters whose degradation could affect
interstate commerce, including wetlands adjacent to jurisdictional waters.284
Those regulations provided some protection for groundwater, but only
tangentially in connection with the definition of wetlands as “areas that are
inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support” wetland vegetation.285 But even that stinting protection of
groundwater was challenged as overbroad in a pair of U.S. Supreme Court
cases.286 Both cases arose under Section 404 of the CWA—known as the dredge

281

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 993–95; MULLIGAN, supra note 280.
283
After a decade of inconsistency, the Corps and the EPA harmonized their regulatory definitions in the
1980–82 period. See EPA, Final Rule Defining “Waters of the United States,” 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19,
1980); Army Corps of Engineers, Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,810
(July 22, 1982). See generally MULLIGAN, supra note 280, at 12–13, App (explaining how Corps and EPA
“streamlined and harmonized” their regulatory definitions by 1982).
284
Army Corps of Engineers, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,810–31,811 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)).
285
Id. (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1982)). The Corps had recognized that otherwise protected
wetlands could be fed by groundwater as early as 1977. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19, 1977).
286
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Rapanos v. United States, 547
U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion). A related third Supreme Court case challenged the jurisdictional reach of
“waters of the United States,” but did not focus directly on groundwater. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
282
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and fill program—which regulates the discharge of rock, sand, dirt, and other
fill material into protected waterways and wetlands.287
First, the Supreme Court sustained the 1980 & 1982 rules in United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. against a challenge by a developer who wanted
to fill wetlands on its property for a housing development without first obtaining
a CWA permit.288 Although the developer did not challenge the regulation of
wetlands hydrologically connected to surface water bodies, it claimed federal
agencies had no jurisdiction over wetlands supported by groundwater—areas it
dismissively referred to as lands with “poor drainage.”289 The developer asserted
that regulating such groundwater-fed wetlands would give the government
unwarranted jurisdiction over millions of acres of land throughout the nation.290
Exercise of such broad jurisdiction, it claimed, would amount to a regulatory
taking of private property without just compensation.291 Further, it continued, a
broad construction of jurisdiction would allow federal agencies to usurp the
states’ traditional role as land use planners because such interpretation would
impede the conversion of wetlands to state-sanctioned uses including residential
construction and agriculture.292 The Court rejected such rationales, focusing
instead on the statutory purpose of promoting hydrologic “integrity.”293
Adopting a functional approach informed by science, the Court embraced the
Corps’ determination that the regulation of pollution cannot rely on “artificial
lines” but must acknowledge that water moves in “hydrologic cycles.”294 The
Court concluded that wetlands—whether fed by groundwater or surface water—
play an integral role of protecting water quality and upheld the definition of
wetlands in the 1980s rules.295
287
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). See generally Obtain a Permit, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, https://www.usace.
army.mil/Missions/Civil-Works/Regulatory-Program-and-Permits/Obtain-a-Permit/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2021)
(setting forth procedures for obtaining a dredge and fill permit); Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENG’RS, https://www.spl.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory/Jurisdictional-Determination/Section404-of-the-Clean-Water-Act/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2021) (explaining § 404 permit and exceptions).
288
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 139.
289
Respondent’s Brief at 2–3, Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (No. 84-701) (claiming federal
agencies lacked jurisdiction over wetlands supported by a high groundwater table or by precipitation).
290
Id. at 2–3, 43 (arguing the regulation of lands with “poor drainage” would interfere with the lands’
ability to produce approximately twenty-five percent of the major crops grown in the United States).
291
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 289, at 46–50 (claiming the Riverside property “presently is totally
unproductive, lying vacant and unused” and filling in the land “is a necessary element of the development of the
property for any economically productive purpose”).
292
Id. at 43.
293
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 132–35.
294
Id. (approving Corps’ conclusion that wetlands adjacent to protected waters “may function as integral
parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source in the
adjacent [surface] bodies of water”).
295
Id. The Corps had urged the Court to root its decision in science, asserting “the Corps’ definition of
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Second, more than twenty years later in Rapanos v. United States, the Court
veered from science to textualism in a badly-fractured decision that yielded no
majority opinion.296 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, concluded that the
Corps’ regulatory definition was an overly expansive, impermissible
construction of the CWA that went beyond the intent of Congress.297 His
conclusion turned on a hyper-technical linguistic distinction: the CWA
designates as protected “the waters” (rather than simply “waters”) of the United
States.298 Relying on the 1954 second edition of Webster’s New International
Dictionary, Justice Scalia determined that CWA protection was confined to
surface features—including “only those relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are
described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’”299
Continuing this focus on surface waters, Justice Scalia restricted statutory
protection of adjacent wetlands to only those with a “continuous surface
connection” to other jurisdictional waters.300 Justice Scalia’s opinion evidenced
a concern for private property and a disdain for regulation that cast the
landowner as a victim, who “for backfilling his own wet fields . . . faced 63
months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal and civil
fines.”301 As a further supporting rationale, he expressed solicitude for the states
and a desire to avoid what he characterized as bringing virtually all land and
water resource planning under federal control.302 So strong was this concern that
wetlands, which attaches no significance to the source of water inundating or saturating an area characterized by
wetlands vegetation, is fully consistent with both congressional and scientific understanding of the many
valuable services performed by wetlands.” Reply Brief for the United States at 8, Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. 121 (No. 84-701)
296
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality
(joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito); Justices Roberts and Kennedy wrote separate concurring
opinions; and Justice Stevens wrote a dissent (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
297
Id. at 739 (plurality opinion).
298
Id. at 732 (emphasis added). As Justice Scalia explained:
The Corps’ expansive approach might be arguable if the CWA defined “navigable waters” as
“water of the United States.” But “the waters of the United States” is something else. The use of
the definite article (“the”) and the plural number (“waters”) show plainly that § 1362(7) does not
refer to water in general. In this form, “the waters” refers more narrowly to [a dictionary definition focusing on surface geographic features].
Id.
299

Id. at 739.
Id. at 741–42 (interpreting the CWA as protecting “only those wetlands with a continuous surface
connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation
between ‘waters’ and wetlands that are ‘adjacent to’ such waters and covered by the Act”).
301
Id. at 721. In concurrence, Justice Kennedy took the plurality to task for what he criticized as its “unduly
dismissive” tone that gave little weight to the “[i]mportant public interests” served by the CWA and by the
protection of wetlands. Id. at 777 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
302
Id. at 737 (plurality opinion) (citing to the statutory savings clause in § 1251(b)).
300
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Justice Scalia brushed aside the position of a brief filed by thirty-three states and
the District of Columbia in support of the Corps’ regulation, opining that the
statute did not permit states to “unburden themselves” and shift “controversial
decisions” to federal regulators.303 In contrast, in what proved to be a highly
influential concurrence,304 Justice Kennedy articulated a “significant nexus”
test, under which CWA jurisdiction extends to those waters and wetlands that
“significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other
covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”305 Justice Kennedy
rooted his concurrence in the statutory purpose of promoting hydrologic
integrity and in wetland science, taking particular note of the valuable ecological
services provided by wetlands.306
ii. The Obama Administration’s Rule
A second stage of rulemaking followed the 1980s rules and inconclusive
Supreme Court decisions.307 In 2015, the Obama administration promulgated its
“Clean Water Rule” to amend the definition of the statutory phrase “waters of
the United States.”308 The rule cited to the CWA’s purpose of restoring and
maintaining hydrologic integrity.309 Of critical importance, the rule was rooted
firmly in science and recognized the hydrologic connection between surface
water and groundwater. It claimed faithfulness to the “best available peerreviewed science,” including more than 1,200 peer-reviewed publications
collected in a report entitled Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to
Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence.310
In most aspects, the rule expanded the scope of federally protected waters.
It listed six categories of surface waters that are jurisdictional by rule in all

303

Id. at 737 n.8.
MULLIGAN, supra note 280.
305
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 778–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
306
Id. at 759–62, 765–66.
307
Chief Justice Roberts lamented that “no opinion [in Rapanos] commands a majority of the Court on
precisely how to read Congress’s limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act” and encouraged the agencies to
refine their views of the scope of their power under the statute. Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
308
Army Corps of Engineers & EPA, Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80
Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116).
309
Id. at 37,056–37,057.
310
Id. (citing to science report prepared by the EPA’s Office of Research and Development and subjected
to a comprehensive technical review by the EPA’s Science Advisory Board); see also James R. Mihelcic &
Mark Rains, Where’s the Science? Recent Changes to Clean Water Act Threaten Wetlands and Thousands of
Miles of Our Nation’s Rivers and Streams, 37 ENV’T ENG’G SCI. 173, 175–76 (2020) (describing the role of
science in the promulgation of the Obama-era rule).
304
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instances, including “adjacent wetlands.”311 Following Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Rapanos, the rule also included numerous additional
categories of surface waters deemed to be jurisdictional if a case-specific
analysis shows them to have a “significant nexus” to other jurisdictional
waters.312 The rule also carried forward the previous definition of wetlands,
which made no distinction between those supported by surface runoff and those
supported by groundwater.313 But despite these broad protections, the 2015 rule
added new categorical exclusions from jurisdictional protection, downplaying
them as a simple codification of longstanding agency practice.314 Most notable
for purposes of this Article, those categorical exclusions listed “groundwater”
and “groundwater recharge basins.”315
Reflecting the controversial nature of the topic, the rule received its share of
harsh criticism from all sides. Some pro-development forces denounced it as “a
raw and tyrannical power grab that will crush jobs . . . and place landowners,
small businesses, farmers, and manufacturers on the road to a regulatory and
economic hell.”316 Critics from the environmental community, for their part,
argued that the new categorical exclusions ignored the advice of the agencies’
own scientific advisory board.317 Further, they argued that the rule relied
impermissibly on the rationale of administrative convenience, rather than on
scientific principles.318

311

Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057–37,059, 37,104 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1–

6)).
312

Id. at 37,058 & 37,106 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7–8)).
Id. at 37,106 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(4)).
314
Id. at 37,059 (referring to the addition of “several exclusions reflecting longstanding agency
practice[s]”).
315
Id. at 37,105 (excluding “groundwater drained through subsurface drainage systems” and all
groundwater generally) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(5) & (b)(7)). Despite such exclusions of
groundwater from protection in its own right, the rule required a CWA permit for discharges into groundwater
that migrated to hydrologically connected surface jurisdictional waters. See Michael C. Blumm & Steven M.
Thiel, (Ground)Waters of the United States: Unlawfully Excluding Tributary Groundwater from Clean Water
Act Jurisdiction, 46 ENV’T L. 333, 371–74 (2016).
316
Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2 (2017) [hereinafter
Owen, Little Streams] (quoting former Congressman John Boehner and collecting other condemnations). Owen
highlights an underappreciated environmentally protective trend of CWA regulations that protect “little
streams.” Id.
317
See, e.g., Blumm & Thiel, supra note 315, at 368–70 (arguing the 2015 rule is underinclusive because
it categorically exempts all groundwater from CWA regulation in contravention of the purposes, terms, and
judicial interpretations of the CWA, and calling for the inclusion of tributary groundwater as a jurisdictional
water).
318
See id. at 368–69.
313
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iii. The Trump Administration’s Rule
Reflecting the political volatility of CWA jurisdiction, the Trump
administration repealed the Obama rule just four years later.319 Then in 2020, it
published a final replacement rule—the “Navigable Waters Protection Rule.” In
contrast to the Obama administration’s rule, the Trump administration’s rule did
not purport to rely on science. The EPA’s Scientific Advisory Board concluded
that “the proposed rule lacks a scientific justification, while potentially
introducing new risks to human and environmental health.”320 The EPA itself
expressly disavowed reliance on science, asserting “science cannot dictate
where to draw the line between Federal and State waters.”321
The Trump replacement rule closely tracked Justice Scalia’s plurality
opinion in Rapanos.322 In fact, President Trump’s executive order explicitly
instructed the Corps and the EPA to “consider interpreting the term ‘navigable
waters’ . . . in a manner consistent with the opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in
Rapanos v. United States.”323 With respect to groundwater, the Trump rule
retained the Obama-era exclusions of groundwater.324 But going even further to
exclude groundwater from regulation, the rule constricted jurisdiction over
“adjacent wetlands” to only those wetlands that abut or have a “direct hydrologic
surface connection” to other protected waters.325 Environmental groups
challenged the rule as interpreting CWA jurisdiction too narrowly, whereas
cattlemen and ranchers claimed the rule asserted jurisdiction over some
intermittent streams and adjoining wetlands that should have been left
unregulated.326

319
Army Corps of Engineers & EPA, Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of PreExisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (repealing 2015 rule and restoring the pre-2015 regulatory
rule).
320
Mihelcic & Rains, supra note 310, at 176 (discussing Scientific Advisory Board’s conclusions).
321
Id.
322
Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250
(Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. Part 328 and various sections of Title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations).
323
Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the “Waters of the United
States” Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017).
324
Navigable Waters Protection Rule, Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 22,251,
22,252 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(b)(2) & 328.3(b)(11)).
325
Id. at 22,338 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(4) & 328.3(c)(1)) (emphasis added).
326
See generally Amena H. Saiyid, Farmers, Ranchers Dispute Legal Limits of Revamped Water Rule,
BLOOMBERG L. (May 11, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/farmersranchers-dispute-legal-limits-of-revamped-water-rule?context=article-related (summarizing arguments of those
opposing expanded jurisdiction).
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iv. The Biden Administration’s Rule
Early in his administration, President Biden announced his intent to revise
the Trump-era definition of “waters of the United States” in accordance with,
among other things, “[t]he latest science and the effect of climate change on our
waters.”327 The proposed rule recodifies the pre-Obama-era rule, with additional
protections for waters that would meet either of the Scalia or Kennedy tests from
Rapanos.328
b. Regulated Actions—The “Discharge of Pollutants”
The Clean Water Act limits jurisdiction to activities that constitute the
“discharge of pollutants,” defined as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source.”329 Under this provision, polluting activities fall
within the regulatory net if they threaten to pollute or destroy protected waters.
Concerning groundwater, one controversial issue has been whether the statute
regulates point source discharges that migrate through groundwater before
reaching navigable surface waters, resulting in an indirect discharge to navigable
waters.330 The Supreme Court addressed this question just two days after
publication of the Trump administration’s WOTUS rule.331 In Maui v. Hawaii
Wildlife Fund, the Court reaffirmed groundwater’s integral role in the
hydrologic cycle.332 The County of Maui had been discharging about four
million gallons of treated sewage daily down four wells without a CWA
327
Army Announces Intent to Revise Definition of WOTUS, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY (June 9, 2021),
http://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-army-announce-intent-revise-definition-wotus (EPA news release).
328
Revising the Definition of “Waters of the United States,” U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/wotus/revising-definition-waters-united-states (last visited Dec. 16, 2021) (announcing an
intention to “put back into place the pre-2015 definition of ‘waters of the United States,’ updated to reflect
consideration of Supreme Court decisions”); see also supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text (Justice
Scalia’s test from Rapanos), & notes 305–06 and accompanying text (Justice Kennedy’s test from Rapanos).
329
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (emphasis added) (defining “discharge of a pollutant” and
“discharge of pollutants” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source”); id.
§ 1311(a) (except pursuant to permit “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful”).
330
This argument was presaged by Rapanos, as discussed supra Part II.D.2.a. Justice Scalia expressly
disavowed fears that a narrow interpretation of “navigable waters” would allow polluters to evade the permitting
requirements of other sections of the statute, including the Section 402 “national pollutant discharge elimination
system” (NPDES). He opined, but did not decide, that the Act forbade the “addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters” and not merely the “addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters” from any point source.
However, he focused on intermittent streams, through which pollutants naturally wash downstream, rather than
groundwater as a conduit of pollutants. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742–44 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (emphasis added); see also LINDA TSANG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10528, UNCHARTED WATERS:
NAVIGATING THE SUPREME COURT’S NEW CLEAN WATER ACT PERMITTING TEST (2020), https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10528 (summarizing the Supreme Court’s Maui decision).
331
See supra note 322 and accompanying text (indicating the rule was published on April 21, 2020).
332
Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1467–68 (2020) (opinion dated April 23, 2020).
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permit.333 The County did not dispute that the pollutants were dumped into the
Pacific Ocean after traveling a brief distance (approximately one-half mile)
through groundwater. Instead, the County argued for a sweeping exception for
groundwater pollution, claiming that the CWA’s permitting requirement does
not apply if there is “any amount of groundwater between the end of the pipe
and the edge of the navigable water,” such as the Pacific Ocean.334
In a 6-3 decision, the Court, led by Justice Breyer’s majority opinion,
rejected the County of Maui’s proffered “bright-line test” as a nonscientific
interpretation that would create a regulatory “loophole” allowing “easy evasion”
of the CWA’s basic purpose of restoring and maintaining hydrologic integrity.335
The Court held that the CWA requires a permit “if the addition of pollutants
through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the
point source into navigable waters.”336 The opinion was rooted in pragmatism
and adopted a middle ground that the majority viewed as “administratively
workable.”337 Justice Breyer rejected the Ninth Circuit’s opinion below,338
which called for broad regulation of any pollution “fairly traceable” from a point
source to a navigable water.339 At the same time, he rejected the narrow scope
of jurisdiction recognized by the Fourth340 and Sixth Circuits,341 both of which
would have limited federal jurisdiction to direct discharges into surface waters
that did not first travel through groundwater.
Justice Breyer grounded his opinion in science. Citing to the Brief for
Aquatic Scientists included in the record and a scientific encyclopedia, he stated
that “[v]irtually all water, polluted or not, eventually makes its way to navigable

333

Id. at 1469.
Id. at 1469, 1473.
335
Id. at 1470, 1473–75.
336
Id. at 1468, 1476 (emphasis added) (noting that in applying the test, “[t]ime and distance are obviously
important”). Justice Breyer was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and
Kavanaugh. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissent, joined by Justice
Gorsuch. Justice Alito filed a separate dissent.
337
Id. at 1473.
338
Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the CWA
applies to discharges from point sources that are “fairly traceable from the point source to a navigable water
such that the discharge is the functional equivalent of a discharge into the navigable water”).
339
Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1473.
340
Id. at 1469–70, abrogating Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637,
651 (4th Cir. 2018) (limiting CWA regulation over groundwater discharges to cases where there is a “direct
hydrological connection” between the groundwater and navigable surface waters).
341
Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1469–70, abrogating Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir.
2018). Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co. held that “[t]he CWA does not extend liability to
pollution that reaches surface waters via groundwater.” Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 928.
334

KLEIN_1.31.22

2022]

1/31/2022 3:00 PM

GROUNDWATER EXCEPTIONALISM

541

water. This is just as true of groundwater.”342 Engaging in a textual analysis, he
concluded there was no linguistic basis for categorically denying federal
authority over discharges that travel through groundwater before reaching
protected waters.343 Employing a folksy metaphor, Justice Breyer refused to
limit the word “to” as meaning “directly to” a protected water body: “A recipe
might instruct to ‘add the drippings from the meat to the gravy’; that instruction
does not become incomprehensible . . . simply because the drippings will have
first collected in a pan or on a cutting board.”344 Likewise, the CWA did not
relinquish jurisdiction over pollutants traveling some distance through
groundwater before reaching the Pacific Ocean.345
3. The Rationales
Groundwater exceptionalists rely on a number of rationales, both familiar
and unfamiliar from this Article’s previous discussion of state water rights, the
reserved rights doctrine, and interstate allocation. First, they regard groundwater
as an integral part of the land rather than a component of the hydrologic cycle—
an argument that hearkens back to the largely-discredited absolute dominion rule
of state water rights law.346 As a corollary, they suggest that restrictions on the
use of privately-owned lands constitute a regulatory taking requiring
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. In Riverside Bayview Homes, for
example, the landowner/developer characterized the wetlands it sought to fill as
simply lands with “poor drainage,” the regulation of which would give rise to a
takings claim.347 Likewise, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos
characterized wetlands as simply “wet fields” and chastised federal regulators
for impeding the landowner’s desire to “backfill” those fields.348
As a second rationale, exceptionalists argue that regulation of groundwater
under the CWA constitutes a federal power grab because modern knowledge of
surface/groundwater connections could render everyday activities vulnerable to
federal overreach. No longer hiding behind a veil of hydrologic ignorance, some
exceptionalists now acknowledge quite freely—perhaps surprisingly so—that
their fundamental goal is to evade regulation. For example, in an amicus brief
342

Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1470.
Id. at 1475 (concluding the CWA does not limit its scope to pollutant discharges “directly” or
“immediately” from point sources).
344
Id. (emphasis added).
345
Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1477 (concluding the CWA applies to pollutant discharges reaching navigable
waters through groundwater in cases where such a discharge is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge).
346
See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
347
See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
348
See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
343
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filed in Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, the Pacific Legal Foundation
acknowledged that “[n]early all groundwater is hydrologically connected to
surface water.”349 But the regulation of groundwater pollution, the brief claimed,
would impose “intolerable burdens” on landowners, farmers, and others who
“unwitting[ly]” pollute through their land-use practices, such as homeowners
who rely on septic tanks or agriculturalists who employ “regular farming
practices, like fertilizing crops.”350 Likewise, the landowner in Riverside
Bayview Homes351 and Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos352 assailed
the imposition of federal regulation, fines, and imprisonment for statutory
violations, arguing that federal intervention impeded such activities as farming
and filling in wetlands for residential development.353 Similarly, after the Obama
administration promulgated its definition of regulated waters, critics responded
in what one commentator described as “apocalyptic” rhetoric, claiming the rule
placed “landowners, small businesses, farmers, and manufacturers on the road
to a regulatory and economic hell.”354 Comparably, the Trump administration
expressly disavowed science as a proper basis upon which to base the
appropriate scope of federal regulation.355
As a third rationale, exceptionalists employ textualism to interpret the scope
of federal authority under the CWA, purportedly emphasizing plain meaning
over hydrologic understanding and statutory purpose. Justice Scalia, for
example, famously relied on Webster’s New International Dictionary to define
words such as “waters,” eschewing reliance on more technical or scientific
sources.356 In Rapanos, this allowed him to conflate the distinction between
349
See, e.g., supra note 332 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s discussion of the
water cycle in Maui); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 11, Maui, 140
S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18–260).
350
Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 3, 13–14, 13 n.3, Maui,
140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18–260).
351
See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
352
See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
353
See supra note 302 and accompanying text (indicating landowner should not be penalized for
backfilling his own wet fields).
354
Owen, supra note 316, at 2 (citing Congressman John Boehner and other critics employing
“apocalyptic” language); see also What They Are Saying: EPA, U.S. Army Repeal 2015 Rule Defining “Waters
of the United States,” U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/whatthey-are-saying-epa-us-army-repeal-2015-rule-defining-waters-united-states (federal news release collecting
sources critical of the Obama-era rule); Mulligan, supra note 280, at 2 n.8 (“[O]pponents condemn [the Clean
Water Rule] as a massive power grab by Washington, saying it will give bureaucrats carte blanche to swoop in
and penalize landowners every time a cow walks through a ditch.” (quoting Jenny Hopkinson, Obama’s Water
War, POLITICO (May 27, 2015, 10:41 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/epa-waterways-wetlandsrule-118319)).
355
See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
356
See supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text; see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–
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“wetlands” and other waters such that the CWA would regulate only those
wetlands with a “continuous surface connection” to jurisdictional waters,
“making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’
begins.”357 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch took up the mantle of plain meaning
in their dissenting opinion in Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, relying on the
American Heritage Dictionary and Webster’s New International Dictionary to
conclude that statutory jurisdiction over the “addition” of pollutants to
jurisdictional waters excluded pollutants released to groundwater a short
distance from the Pacific Ocean.358
Such exclusionary rationales have been defeated, in some cases, by a judicial
emphasis on the CWA’s primary goal of promoting hydrologic integrity,
undergirded by science. In Riverside Bayview Homes, the Supreme Court
rejected reliance on “artificial lines” and instead focused on the hydrologic
function of wetlands.359 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos followed a
similar approach, considering statutory purpose, the ecosystem services
performed by wetlands, and the “significant nexus” that can exist between
surface waters and groundwater.360 Likewise, the Court in Maui v. Hawaii
Wildlife Fund relied on science, explicitly citing to a brief submitted by aquatic
scientists and a scientific encyclopedia.361
4. The Consequences
As a general pattern, the scope of protected “waters of the United States” has
narrowed over time, increasingly excluding groundwater and associated
wetlands—culminating in the Trump administration’s 2020 jurisdictional rule,
but with likely reversal by the Biden administration.362 Conversely, the scope of
regulated activities that threaten protected surface waters has expanded over
time, as evidenced by the 2020 opinion in Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund.363
There, the Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act regulates some
discharges into groundwater, provided they are the “functional equivalent” of

33 n.5 (2006) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging “scientifically precise distinctions between ‘perennial’ and
‘intermittent’ flows are no doubt available,” but relying on Webster’s Second Dictionary over a technical report
by the U.S. Geological Survey).
357
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.
358
Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1479–80 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
359
See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
360
See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text.
361
See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
362
See supra notes 327–28 and accompanying text.
363
See supra notes 335–41 and accompanying text.
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discharges into protected surface waters.364 This acceptance of groundwater
regulation is quite modest. The Court was careful to narrowly circumscribe
groundwater regulation, observing that “Congress left general groundwater
regulatory authority to the States; its failure to include groundwater in the
general EPA permitting provisions was deliberate.”365 Nevertheless, Maui
represents an important move toward hydrologic integrity.
These opposing patterns have defied scientific understanding. The scope of
the Clean Water Act is clearly a matter of law and politics. But by purporting to
draw a bright line between groundwater (federally unregulated) and surface
water (federally regulated), lawmakers have imbued the analysis with a quasiscientific aura that often fails to reflect the hydrologic reality of the water
cycle.366 As one prominent environmental journalist observed, cases involving
Clean Water Act jurisdiction over groundwater “address distinctions in the law
that are not always present in nature.”367
The CWA cases and rules have also generated analytical confusion. The
EPA and the Corps have promulgated inconsistent and fluctuating rules to
interpret their jurisdiction under the CWA, seemingly based on little more than
the preferred politics of the current occupant of the White House.368 Chief
Justice Roberts bemoaned the lack of clear guidance in his Rapanos
concurrence, complaining that in the absence of clarity “[l]ower courts and
regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.”369
Beyond scientific defiance and analytical confusion, the extent to which the
CWA excludes groundwater has important on-the-ground consequences that
could frustrate the statute’s purpose to promote the “integrity” of the nation’s
waters.370 For example, the narrow Trump-era rule potentially removed federal
protection from millions of acres of wetlands and streams.371 Although estimates

364

See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1472 (2020).
366
See generally Brett Walton, U.S. Courts Issue Contradictory Rulings on Groundwater and the Clean
Water Act, CIRCLE OF BLUE (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.circleofblue.org/2018/world/u-s-courts-issue-contradictoryrulings-groundwater-clean-water-act/ (noting arguments that “address distinctions in the law that are not always
present in nature”).
367
Id.
368
See supra Part II.D.2.a (describing rule changes corresponding to changes in presidential
administrations).
369
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
370
See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
371
See Hannah Northey, Exclusive: Trump Rule Imperils More than 40,000 Waterways, E&E NEWS (Mar.
19, 2021, 1:44 PM), https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/1063727993 (analyzing the consequence
of all changes implemented by the subject rule, not solely those relating to groundwater).
365
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vary significantly, by some counts, the Trump-era rule eliminated federal
protection of seventy percent of waterways and ninety-one percent of wetlands
previously protected under the Obama-era rule.372
III. THE WAY FORWARD: FROM EXCEPTIONALISM TO INTEGRITY
Part II revealed groundwater exceptionalism’s firm grasp on the law, but also
uncovered promising areas where the law is moving toward integrity both in the
hydrologic sense (by recognizing groundwater’s integral role in the water cycle)
and in the legal sense (by grounding decisionmaking in a coherent and
transparent set of analytical principles). This Part compiles those positive signs
into a roadmap useful for fostering further progress and hydrologic
sustainability. Section A builds on the relationships first depicted in Figure 1.373
It adds nuance to the horizontal axis of the figure by taking a closer look at the
propertization of groundwater and suggesting a better conceptualization that
harmonizes underground and surface water. Next, section B fills in detail on the
vertical axis by gathering the encouraging decisions identified in Part II that
reject groundwater under-regulation. Finally, section C culls key analytical
techniques that have supported the movement toward integrity, adding them to
the tool kit for continued progress toward sustainable water use.
A. Rejecting Over-Propertization
Water defies easy and consistent legal classification as it moves through the
hydrologic cycle from surface to underground and back, becomes contaminated
with pollution, or is allocated by officials pursuant to “water rights.” Indeed,
some have articulated a “fluid” view of property rights in water that depends on
context.374 Broadly, scholars recognize three categories of property, albeit with
some blurring at the margins and some inconsistency of terminology: (1) private
property, (2) public property (sometimes called “state property”), and (3)
commons property.375 The traditional bundle of sticks metaphor has been
372
Id. (summarizing results of Army Corps of Engineers database revealing that 40,000 out of 55,519
waters under study did not qualify for federal protection); see also EPA News Release, supra note 327
(concluding under the Trump rule there was a twenty-five percent reduction in the determination of the scope of
protected waters and that the reduction is “particularly significant in arid states, like New Mexico and Arizona,
where nearly every one of over 1,500 streams assessed has been found to be non-jurisdictional”).
373
See supra Part II, fig.1.
374
Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 49,
50 (2010); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351 (1996).
375
See, e.g., Michael Heller, Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 417, 418–21 (2000);
CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, PROPERTY: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND SKILLS 344 (2d ed. 2020); Joseph W. Dellapenna,
Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01(b)(1.01) (discussing private property,
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pressed into service to clarify distinctions among these categories. First, private
property features strong rights of exclusion and transferability.376 Second, public
property, which is owned by federal, state, or local governments, also enjoys
strong rights of exclusion, but such rights are exercised by the governmental
owner or manager.377 Third, commons property incorporates no exclusionary
rights, but it allows for broad use rights.378
Prior to extraction from streams, lakes, or other natural features, in situ water
fits fairly comfortably within the category of public property—neither pure
private property379 nor a true commons,380 as suggested in Figure 2. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, this characterization developed first with respect to surface
water. In a landmark nineteenth century opinion, Illinois Central Railroad Co.
v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the states hold the title to lands
under navigable waters, which “necessarily carries with it control over the
waters above them.”381 As the Court explained, the states hold title to qualifying
submerged lands “in trust for the people of the state,” so that they can enjoy such
activities as commerce, navigation, and fishing in the overlying waters “free
from the obstruction or interference of private parties.”382 Many states claim

public property, and common property in the context of water).
376
See Heller, supra note 375, at 418–19.
377
See id. at 420–21. Heller explains that a state property regime “is similar to commons property in that
no individual stands in a specially privileged position with regard to any resource, but is distinguished from
commons property because the state has a special status or distinct interest—that of owner of all resources able
to include or exclude all individuals.” Id. This Article uses “public property” in the same sense that Heller uses
“state property”—each phrase indicates ownership by some governmental entity at the federal, state, or local
level.
378
See id. at 419–20.
379
See Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 84, at 545–54 (describing water as a “public
good” as distinguished from “private goods,” based on its qualities of indivisibility and publicness); see also
GETCHES, supra note 21, at 85 (asserting that private persons generally “do not ‘own’ water in its natural state”).
380
See KLEIN, supra note 375, at 378 (explaining that international law recognizes only four global
commons: the high seas, the atmosphere, Antarctica, and outer space). Although commentators sometimes
describe in situ water as a “commons” or “common pool resource,” they often use such labels interchangeably
with “public” property. See, e.g., Saxer, supra note 374, at 50 (firmly locating water as a resource that “belongs
to the public and is held in trust for us by the government,” but also referring to water as a “unique common
resource . . . entrusted to the government for the public good”). Compare Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights,
supra note 84, at 550 (describing water as “public good”), with Joseph W. Dellapenna, Is There a Role for
Markets?, in 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 18.08 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2021) (describing water, including
groundwater, as “common pool resources”).
381
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (emphasis added). In this context, “navigable
waters” is a term of art that identifies which waterways are open to public use. See KLEIN, supra note 375, at
690–91 (explaining the concept of “navigability for title purposes” and distinguishing it from other navigability
tests).
382
Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452 (assigning the role of trustee to the states in the context of water bodies
determined to be “navigable” as a term of art).
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through constitution or statute to “own” the waters within their territory.383 But
such claims are better described as a trusteeship that authorizes states to
“control” (in the words of Illinois Central) water use for the benefit of their
citizens, rather than ownership of the corpus of water itself.384 This distinction
is particularly critical in the context of interstate disputes, where the idea of state
ownership of molecules that reside for some period of time within one state
could easily thwart the claims of neighboring states to use a portion of the shared
resource when the molecules migrate or are siphoned across state lines.385
Because water is a fugitive resource that moves through the water cycle, in situ
water should logically retain its public character, whether found below ground
in an aquifer or above ground in a river, lake, or ocean. Nevertheless, as
described previously, the law has been slow to accept this connection.386

383

Klein, supra note 3, at 510–11.
See Klein, supra note 3, at 510–13 (collecting sources describing state ownership as “a fiction” for the
power to regulate); see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17
(2011) (describing water as a public trust).
385
See Mississippi v. Tennessee, 595 U.S. __, slip op. 9–10 (Nov. 22, 2021) (asserting “we have
‘consistently denied’ the proposition that a State may exercise exclusive ownership or control of interstate
‘waters flowing within her boundaries’” (quoting Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
U.S. 92, 102 (1938))); see also supra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing Mississippi’s claim of
groundwater ownership asserted against neighboring Tennessee in an attempt to control the use of water within
an aquifer underlying multiple states).
386
See, e.g., supra Part II.A.1.c (describing the minority “absolute dominion” groundwater doctrine that
purports to recognize landowners’ ownership of water molecules that lie beneath their surface estate). But see
Env’t L. Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 26 Cal. App. 5th 844, 859–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (holding
that the public trust doctrine applies to groundwater extractions that threaten surface waters protected by the
doctrine, but clarifying the “dispositive issue is not the source of the activity, or whether the water that is diverted
or extracted is itself the subject of the public trust, but whether the challenged activity harms a navigable
waterway”).
384
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Figure 2. Property Rights in Water

The classification of state issued “water rights” adds an additional layer of
complexity to the analysis.387 Water rights convey legal authority to use water
diverted from its natural source,388 but do not displace the states’ trusteeship and
control over all water within their borders.389 As such, water rights are a subspecies of property that coexists with state trusteeship,390 as suggested in Figure 2.
In water law parlance, water rights are generally described as “usufructuary,”391

387
Professor Jane Maslow Cohen has observed that water rights are exceptional among property rights
because of “the publicness of water,” and that “public debate, even among lawmakers, may suffer from a lack
of awareness of water rights exceptionalism that may be the direct result of the near-total obsession that
introductory property law courses have with ‘real’ property.” Jane Maslow Cohen, Of Waterbanks, Piggybanks,
and Bankruptcy: Changing Directions in Water Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1809, 1846–47 (2005).
388
See supra Part II.A.
389
See Owen, supra note 31, at 275 (concluding “water use always remains subject to governmental
oversight and control”).
390
See id. at 274–75 (describing “the most prevalent view” under which “private [water] use rights must
coexist with, and often remain subordinate to, overriding public interests in waterways” and concluding under
this view “to an even greater extent than land use rights, water use always remains subject to governmental
oversight and control”); see also Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 679, 684–87 (2007) (suggesting web-of-interests is a better metaphor than bundle-of-rights to describe
overlapping interests in water rights and to better assess the nature of “the thing” in question (citing Craig
Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 281,
291–95 (2002))).
391
DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 86–87 (4th ed. 2009) (distinguishing appropriative
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with little additional explication. But basic principles of property law furnish a
ready model for this type of arrangement: two parties can simultaneously hold
possessory and nonpossessory rights in the same property, such as a fee simple
encumbered by an easement, covenant, license, or profit à prendre.392 Accordingly, water rights convey only a nonpossessory usufructuary property right,393
subject to state trusteeship and regulatory authority. In the wetter eastern states,
riparian water rights edge more toward notions of common ownership.394 Each
riparian landowner has broad use rights (the right to make reasonable use of the
watercourse) and limited exclusionary rights (the inability to exclude other riparians from likewise making reasonable uses).395 In contrast, water rights under
the prior appropriation doctrine veer more toward private property. Water rights
holders in those jurisdictions have broad use rights (perpetual as long as the water is put continuously to a beneficial use that stays within the parameters of the
original appropriation) and also broad exclusionary rights (“senior” water users
can exclude others from diverting until the senior’s full right has been satisfied).396 Of critical importance—but seldom stated explicitly—both riparian and
appropriative rights are nonpossessory use rights that remain subject to the
states’ overriding trusteeship and regulatory authority, regardless of whether the
water rights themselves more closely resemble commons or private property.397
“usufructuary” rights from “possessory” rights).
392
KLEIN, supra note 375, at 516–18; see Zellmer & Harder, supra note 390, at 683 n.21 (citing
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: INTRODUCTION & FREEHOLD INTERESTS, ch.1, intro. note, at 3 (1936)); see
also Saxer, supra note 374, at 105 (concluding water rights should best be classified as licenses).
393
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 445, 448–49 (2008) (referring to water rights as usufructuary property interests); GETCHES, supra note 391,
at 86 (stating water rights are usufructuary rights as opposed to possessory rights).
394
See supra Part II.A.1.a (discussion of riparian rights doctrine); see also supra note 378 and
accompanying text (discussing the bundle of sticks metaphor and commons property). Classification of riparian
rights has been difficult. As one water casebook chronicles, riparian rights “have been described as part and
parcel of the land itself, corporeal hereditaments, incorporeal hereditaments, easements, appurtenances and as
tenancies in common in the stream.” WEBER ET AL., supra note 67, at 253.
395
As Professor Joseph Dellapenna explained, riparian rights “allow anyone with lawful access to use a
common pool resource as long as the use is reasonable”—constituting a rule of “common property rather than a
rule of private property, similar to tenants in common using or disputing the use of their jointly held land.”
Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights, supra note 84, at 553–54, 561–65; see also Carol M. Rose, The Several
Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L REV. 129,
139–43 (1998) (classifying both eastern and western water rights as “limited common property regimes” that
are “commons with respect to the membership, but property with respect to outsiders”).
396
See supra Part II.A.1.b (discussing prior appropriation doctrine); see also THOMPSON ET AL., supra
note 9, at 251 (contrasting perpetual water rights with term-limited rights-of-way to use federal lands and
navigable waters for ski areas, power plants, and the operation of hydropower dams on rivers).
397
See, e.g., Kobobel v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1134 (Colo. 2011) (holding that a water right
is a “usufructuary right” and that “one does not ‘own’ water but owns the right to use water within the limitations
of the prior appropriation doctrine”). Not all courts have observed the nonpossessory nature of water rights.
When evaluating claims that environmental and other regulations work a regulatory taking of water rights, a few
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In contrast to surface water rights, groundwater rights in some states
seemingly take on the attributes of possessory property analogous to private
property rights in real estate. According to one commentator, states perform this
“conceptual shimmy” by aligning groundwater more with land than with surface
water,398 which tracks the water-as-land rationale frequently used to bolster
groundwater exceptionalism. According to this source, “the folding of
groundwater doctrine not into the doctrinal domain of surface water but into the
alternate domain of land law, thanks to the rigid logic of the ad infernos doctrine
and the casual neglect of the ‘occult,’” is a costly mistake in an era of
increasingly scarce water supplies.399 States generally follow one of five
common law groundwater doctrines, sometimes with statutory overlays,
regardless of whether they fall within a riparian or appropriation jurisdiction for
surface rights.400 Under those doctrines, landowners often have some type of
property right in the groundwater beneath their surface estate.401 The precise
contours of this right vary from state to state, but are often at odds with the wellestablished usufructuary nature of surface rights. Many states apply some
version of a rule of capture under which landowners acquire a relatively
unfettered right to pump water from the shared aquifer underlying their
property.402 As one casebook explains, there is “little doubt once . . .
groundwater is brought to the surface[] [that] a personal property ownership
interest in those molecules of water has been perfected.”403 At the furthest end
of the spectrum, Texas recognizes a landowner’s property right in subsurface
groundwater in situ, even if it has not been captured and brought to the
surface.404

courts have analyzed the restrictions as “physical takings” of property, which in turn requires the courts to
conceptualize water rights as possessory rights in particular molecules of water, rather than nonpossessory rights
of use. However, this view has been widely criticized and has not gained much acceptance. See Michael C.
Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting Background Principles in Takings Litigation, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1165,
1196–1200 (2019) (noting “withering criticism” of a decision holding water diversion restrictions should be
analyzed as physical takings); Owen, Taking Groundwater, supra note 31, at 273–74 (discussing application of
“categorical physical takings analysis” to water rights and concluding “many more cases have rejected [this]
analytical methodology than have followed it”).
398
See Cohen, supra note 387, at 1853 (noting groundwater law has been folded into land law rather than
surface water law).
399
Id.
400
See supra Part II.A.1.c.
401
Id.
402
Id.
403
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 502.
404
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 842 (Tex. 2012); see also Owen, supra note 31, at
276–77 (describing the Texas Supreme Court decision holding landowners own water beneath their land, even
prior to pumping).
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This singling out of groundwater for special property status triggers the
adverse micro-consequences previously summarized in Table 1.405 First, it
defies hydrologic understanding. As the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged
as early as 1962 when upholding the constitutionality of certain groundwater
regulations, it would be “the height of inconsistency” to premise surface water
rights on demonstrated possession and control of water, but award groundwater
rights on the basis of ownership of the overlying land.406 The court rooted its
statement in a “scientific premise”: “One cannot separate ground water and
surface water. What is surface water at one time is ground water the next. What
is ground water today becomes surface water tomorrow.”407 Further,
exceptionalism produces analytical incoherence. For example, the declining
English rule of absolute dominion allows landowners to pump as much
groundwater as they can from beneath their land, even if such capture causes
neighboring wells to go dry.408 In practice, the rule’s promise of absolute
property rights turns out to be an illusion. Some have called the absolute
ownership doctrine “a misnomer if ever there was one” because “[a]s soon as
someone with a more powerful pump comes along, existing uses of the aquifer
can be diminished or completely eviscerated, with no legal recourse.”409 Despite
recognition of private property rights in underground water, absolute ownership
jurisdictions recognize at most a usufructuary right in surface waters,410 even
though the same water molecules may move between surface and underground
locations—a contradiction that makes little hydrologic or analytical sense.
Finally, treating groundwater as private property undermines the foundational
goals of riparianism and prior appropriation, as applied to surface waters:
establishing fair and consistent principles to guide individual use of public
waters.411 If a portion of those waters can be used at will as private property,
then the surface allocation rules are severely undermined.
B. Reversing Under-Regulation
In many cases, groundwater exceptionalism thwarts regulation, thereby
weakening doctrines aimed at the orderly distribution of water use rights or the
prevention of pollution. Strategic advocates have systematically sought to
“propertize” water and other resources with the clear goal of impeding
405
406
407
408
409
410
411

See supra Part II (introductory paragraphs).
Williams v. Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 588–89 (Kan. 1962).
Id. at 590 (quoting Foley, supra note 1, at 497).
See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
Zellmer & Harder, supra note 390, at 694–95.
See supra Part II.A.1.c.
See supra Parts II.A.1.b & II.A.1.c.
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regulation. As one scholar explains, “For most property rights advocates,
constitutional property rights are a means to anti-regulatory ends.”412 Such
tactics render exceptionalism rationales disingenuous, stifle productive debate,
and interfere with the realization of doctrinal goals. This critique is not a call for
more (or less) regulation of water rights and water pollution. Rather, it argues
that drawing a nonscientific line between groundwater and surface water is a
distraction that does not meaningfully advance legal policy.
Overall, the law has moved forward incrementally. It has followed a broad
pattern under which courts and lawmakers have been increasingly willing to
regulate groundwater that threatens to deplete or pollute protected surface
waters. Courts and lawmakers, however, are more reluctant to recognize
groundwater as worthy of protection in its own right. This pattern emerges in the
context of federal reserved water rights, where the law upheld regulation of
groundwater that depletes reserved surface supplies almost half a century before
holding that groundwater itself can be the protected subject of federal
reservations.413 It also appears in the context of interstate water allocation, where
the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted five interstate compacts as implicitly
authorizing the restriction of groundwater use that threatens to reduce surface
allocations, but did not decide that groundwater itself could be the subject of an
interstate apportionment until 2021.414 In addition, the Court has extended CWA
jurisdiction over some groundwater pollution that impacts surface supplies, such
as the Pacific Ocean, but the statute’s implementing regulations have been
subject to political pressure that largely resists protecting groundwater itself.415
This section summarizes the consequences of groundwater exceptionalism,
as discussed on a doctrine-by-doctrine basis in Part II, and shows how each
contributes to a broader anti-regulatory whole. The discussion also highlights
positive examples of when courts and lawmakers have rejected exceptionalism
arguments that undermine doctrinal goals. The landmark positive developments
are summarized in Table 2, with supporting analysis provided in the subsections
below.

412
Owen, Taking Groundwater, supra note 31, at 284 (citing sources explaining how “conservative
activists” asserted regulatory takings claims as a “severe brake” on federal and state regulation).
413
See infra Part II.B (tracing developments from Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) to
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2017)).
414
See infra Part II.C.
415
See infra Part II.D.
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Table 2. Moving Toward the Regulation of Groundwater
Groundwater as
Regulated Threat

Groundwater as
Protected Resource

State Water
Rights

Conjunctive management

Conjunctive management

Federal Reserved
Rights

Cappaert v. United States
(U.S. 1976)416

Agua Caliente Band v.
Coachella Valley Water
Dist. (9th Cir. 2017)417

Interstate
Allocation

Some regulation of
tributary groundwater that
impacts state allocations
under interstate
compacts418

Hood ex. rel. Mississippi v.
Memphis (5th Cir. 2009)419

Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife
Fund (U.S. 2020)421

No clear regulatory
guidance defining extent to
which CWA protects
groundwater422

Clean Water Act

Mississippi v. Tennessee
(U.S. 2021)420

1. State Water Rights Doctrine
Each state has devised a system for allocating scarce water resources among
competing users, addressing such questions as who can use water and where

416

Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138 (holding that groundwater can be regulated as threat to reserved surface

rights).
417
Compare Agua Caliente Band, 849 F.3d at 1270 (holding that groundwater can be protected as a federal
reserved right), with In re Gen. Adjudication of the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (holding that groundwater cannot be protected as a federal reserved
right).
418
See supra Part II.C.2.a (discussing five Supreme Court decisions interpreting mid-twentieth century
compacts as regulating at least some groundwater).
419
Hood ex rel. Mississipipi v. Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 629–30 (5th Cir. 2009) (suggesting groundwater
aquifers are the proper subject of interstate allocation).
420
Mississippi v. Tennessee, 595 U.S. __ (2021); see also Report of Special Master Eugene E. Siler, Jr. at
27–28, 32, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 143, Orig. (Nov. 5, 2020) (suggesting Mississippi’s sole remedy lies
in an equitable apportionment of groundwater).
421
Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1467 (2020) (holding the CWA regulates discharges into
groundwater that are the “functional equivalent” of direct discharges into navigable waters).
422
See supra Part II.D.2.a.
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those resources can be applied. Eastern riparianism calls for broad sharing
among riparian landowners and also confines water use to the same tract of land
or watershed from which the water was diverted.423 Western appropriation, in
contrast, generally allows anyone to use water at any place, but addresses
shortages with a system of temporal priority.424 When confronted with
increasing scarcity brought on by drought, climate change, population growth,
and expanded use, each doctrine has given groundwater users broad latitude to
circumvent existing allocation rules as long as they pump water from a
hydrologically-meaningless source known as “percolating groundwater.”425
Often, administrators know that groundwater pumping interferes with
established surface rights under longstanding doctrine, but decline to regulate
it.426 Following groundwater exceptionalism allows decisionmakers to postpone
making hard decisions under the guise of pseudoscience. This de facto
deregulation leads, in many cases, to the very overuse and conflicts that
riparianism and appropriation were designed to address. Increasingly, however,
states have begun to implement what they call the “conjunctive management” or
“integrated management” of water, which coordinates the regulation of both
surface water and groundwater to promote effective management of all the
states’ water resources.427 This serves both to protect surface water rights from
depletion by well pumping and to protect groundwater rights in their own right
from unauthorized interference.
2. Federal Reserved Water Rights
Under the federal reserved rights doctrine, when the government reserves
federal land for a federal purpose, it impliedly reserves sufficient unappropriated
water necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.428 The doctrine is
designed to advance congressional purposes associated with federal lands over

423

See supra Part II.A.1.a.
See supra Part II.A.1.b.
425
See supra Part II.A.1.c.
426
As the Colorado Supreme Court explained, “Although historically there had been little regulation of
groundwater well pumping, by the 1960s there was growing conflict between surface and groundwater users
because the use of largely [unregulated] wells was greatly increasing the withdrawal of tributary groundwater
and thereby depleting the surface flows of rivers.” Kobobel v. Colo. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1135
(Colo. 2011) (explaining how the state adopted legislation to integrate the use of some groundwater known as
“tributary” with the use of surface water after the state supreme court “acknowledged the detrimental impact of
well pumping on senior surface water rights holders”).
427
See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text (explaining conjunctive management in prior
appropriation jurisdictions); see also supra note 126 and accompanying text (calling for “conjunctive
management of surface and underground waters” consistent with “physical laws” in riparian jurisdictions).
428
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
424
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those of competing state users.429 In an effort to evade regulation, state water
users have sought to create groundwater-related loopholes, but those efforts have
been rebuffed consistently.430
In 1976, the Court established in Cappaert v. United States that groundwater
users can be regulated when their wells threaten to deplete reserved rights in
surface waters.431 Tethering its holding to doctrinal purpose, the Court explained
that “since the implied-reservation-of-rights doctrine is based on the necessity
of water for the purpose of the federal reservation, we hold that the United States
can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of
surface or groundwater.”432 The Ninth Circuit went a step further in 2017,
holding in Agua Caliente Band v. Coachella Valley Water District that
groundwater itself could be protected under a federal reservation.433 As the court
observed, “If the United States can protect against groundwater diversions, it
follows that it can protect the groundwater itself.”434 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari and no subsequent litigation has provided the Court a chance to
articulate its views.
3. Interstate Water Allocation
Justice Holmes memorably extolled interstate water allocations as an
alternative to war between the states.435 Such allocations—whether by
agreement or by Supreme Court decree—routinely exclude some or all
groundwater from their calculations. Many allocations predated the
“groundwater revolution”436 and understandably overlooked groundwater at a
time when the resource was not widely used. Strategically exploiting this
oversight, some states allowed thousands of post-agreement wells to be drilled,
thereby circumventing limits on their allocated share of interstate surface
rivers.437 This strategy defeats the very purpose of interstate water allocations
by triggering water wars—metaphorical wars, if not physical ones.

429

See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
431
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
432
Id. at 143.
433
849 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 468, 469 (2017).
434
Id. at 1271.
435
New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342–43 (1931) (declaring “[a] river is more than an amenity,
it is a treasure” that “offers a necessity of life that must be rationed” among neighboring states according to “an
equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas”).
436
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
437
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
430
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The modern Court has generally rejected such efforts. It has interpreted
several old interstate compacts as authorizing the regulation of at least some
groundwater pumping that threatens to deplete a state’s share of an interstate
river.438 Further, the Court has developed new remedies to prod recalcitrant
states to stay within their respective water budgets.439 Such efforts to prevent the
under-regulation of groundwater have been met with mixed success, as states
continue to engage in strategic behavior to maximize the volume of water
available to them.440
Going further, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that groundwater
itself can be the subject of an equitable apportionment under appropriate facts.
In the original action Mississippi v. Tennessee, Mississippi claimed that it owns
all groundwater that resided beneath its territory at the time it entered the Union
in 1817.441 Complaining that Tennessee wells had siphoned groundwater from
beneath its borders, Mississippi adamantly resisted sharing groundwater through
an equitable apportionment and instead sought more than a half billion dollars
in damages from its neighbor.442 In defense, Tennessee argued that the sole
remedy available to Mississippi was an equitable apportionment of the disputed
groundwater that lies in a common aquifer underlying both states.443 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that application of the doctrine to the disputed
aquifer would be “‘sufficiently similar’ to past applications [to surface water] to
warrant the same treatment.”444
4. The Clean Water Act
Of all the doctrines discussed in this Article, the CWA most directly aligns
doctrinal purpose with scientific reality through its call “to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”445
Developers and polluters have argued to exclude groundwater from the statute’s
scope, but their arguments differ significantly from exceptionalism arguments

438

See supra Part II.C.1.a.
See supra notes 228, 259–60 and accompanying text.
440
See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text.
441
See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text (discussing Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 143, Orig.
(Nov. 5, 2020)).
442
See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
443
See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.
444
Mississippi v. Tennessee, 595 U.S. __, slip op. at 7 (Nov. 22, 2021); see also Hood ex rel. Mississipipi
v. Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 629–30 (5th Cir. 2009) (in related litigation, holding that “[t]he fact that this particular
water source is located underground, as opposed to resting above ground as a lake, is of no analytical
significance”).
445
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
439
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advanced in other legal contexts. Rather than feign hydrologic ignorance, they
generally concede that nearly all groundwater is hydrologically connected to
surface water.446 Using that admission as sword rather than shield, they
forthrightly admit to a deregulatory agenda and claim that the regulation of
surface and groundwater would subject them to “intolerable burdens.”447
Exceptionalists have achieved mixed success in these efforts. In the 2020
opinion of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
groundwater pollution is not categorically excluded from regulation under the
CWA.448 Rather, it can be regulated in cases where it is the “functional
equivalent” of a direct discharge into protected navigable waters, thereby
promoting the statutory goal of fostering hydrologic “integrity.”449 Despite that
encouraging sign, the law has not yet clearly settled on the degree to which
groundwater itself can be protected under the statute. Instead, an inconsistent
series of administrative rules and judicial interpretations fail to provide clear
guidance.450
C. Restoring Integrity: A Roadmap
In 1894, attorney Clesson Kinney introduced lawyers to a new water
vocabulary—featuring made-up terms such as percolating groundwater,
subflow, and known channels.451 Although superficially impressive, these terms
are hydrologically meaningless: they misleadingly suggest that groundwater is
not fully a part of the hydrologic cycle.452 Since that time, the law has
inconsistently embraced and rejected groundwater exceptionalism. This section
reviews the lessons emerging from Part II to cull analytical techniques that have
enjoyed particular success in restoring integrity to water law, as summarized in
Table 3. Although many are simple techniques, they can offer a powerful
antidote to exceptionalism, leading toward sustainable use of water resources.

446
447
448

See supra notes 309–12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 349–50 and accompanying text.
See supra note 336 and accompanying text (analyzing Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462

(2020)).
449
450
451
452

See supra note 336 and accompanying text
See supra Part II.D.2.a.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Table 3. A Toolkit of Analytical Techniques
Technique

Positive Model

Reliance on scientific references, data,
and analysis

Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund (U.S.
2020)453

 Dictionaries and encyclopedias
 Computer models

Clean Water Rule (2015)454

Burden of proof aligns with water
cycle

Presumption that groundwater is
tributary and subject to regulation456

Conjunctive management455

Required record-keeping of
groundwater use
Analysis rooted in doctrinal purpose
 Focus on hydrologic connections

Cappaert v. United States (U.S.
1908) 457
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund (U.S.
2020)458
Mississippi v. Tennessee (U.S.
2021)459

Analysis freed of unviable Fifth
Amendment claims

Riverside Bayview Homes (U.S.
1985)460

453
140 S. Ct. 1462, 1470–71 (2020) (relying in part on a scientific encyclopedia and brief submitted by
aquatic scientists in upholding regulation of groundwater).
454
See supra notes 308–10 and accompanying text (Obama-era rule defining scope of protected waters
under the CWA based in part on the best available peer-reviewed science).
455
See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text (discussing state water rights law).
456
See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.
457
426 U.S. 128, 138, 142, 147 (1976) (upholding regulation of groundwater threatening a federal reserved
right in surface water to promote doctrinal purpose of supporting tribes).
458
Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1477 (referring to underlying statutory objectives to provide guidance and asserting
“[d]ecisions should not create serious risks either of undermining state regulation of groundwater or of creating
loopholes that undermine the statute’s basic federal regulatory objectives”).
459
See supra note 247 and accompanying text (rejecting Mississippi’s attempt to circumvent the purposes
of equitable apportionment by claiming ownership of the groundwater beneath its territory).
460
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129 (1985) (dismissing as “spurious”
the constitutional claim that groundwater regulation requires compensation under the Fifth Amendment).
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1. Analysis Based on Science and Data
Coherent laws must be rooted in physical reality. As a first step, some
decisionmakers have begun to consult scientific sources and data when
appropriate. For example, the Obama administration compiled and consulted
more than 1,200 peer-reviewed science reports as a basis for its promulgation of
a new rule clarifying the jurisdictional scope of the CWA, and the majority
opinion in Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund asserted jurisdiction over certain
pollution discharges into groundwater after consulting sources including a
scientific encyclopedia and a brief submitted by aquatic scientists.461 Likewise,
Mississippi v. Tennessee determined that equitable apportionment would be
appropriate for the disputed groundwater after reviewing the special master’s
fact-intensive review of the aquifer’s hydrogeologic characteristics.462 As a
second step, jurists can create incentives for the development of hydrologic data
in a number of ways, such as by (1) presuming groundwater is part of the
hydrologic cycle and placing the burden of proof on those who claim their
pumping does not impact surface waters;463 (2) rejecting groundwater exclusions
premised on administrative convenience rather than hydrology;464 (3) requiring
recordkeeping of groundwater use;465 and (4) making decisions supported by
computer-generated groundwater models.466 In addition, lawmakers can call for
the “conjunctive management” of surface water and groundwater resources as
an overall conceptual framework.467
2. Analysis Rooted in Doctrinal Purpose and Functional Connectivity
Science- and data-driven analyses are necessary, but not sufficient because
laws are based on policy as well as fact. Judges and legislators can advance
461
See supra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing scientific basis of Obama administration’s rule);
see also supra note 342 and accompanying text (discussing scientific basis of Maui).
462
See supra note 246 (discussing special master’s findings).
463
See supra notes 111 (presuming source is unregulated percolating groundwater), 119 (presuming
groundwater is tributary and subject to regulation under Colorado statute), & 228 (in interstate dispute, placing
burden on New Mexico to prove its groundwater pumping had not violated existing compact entitlement) and
accompanying text.
464
See supra note 250 and accompanying text (refusing to recognize administrative convenience exception
in interstate litigation among Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado).
465
See Griggs, A Fifty-Year Retrospective, supra note 11, at 189 (explaining the incentive of upstream
states to resist keeping records of groundwater use that can hurt them in subsequent litigation over interstate
allocations and suggesting courts overcome this incentive by presuming “interstate compacts cover any
extraction of groundwater that reduces apportioned stream flow”).
466
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
467
See supra notes 126 (describing 1997 call by the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code for
conjunctive management “consistent with physical laws”) & 127–29 (recognizing western state efforts to
implement “conjunctive use” or “integrated management” regimes) and accompanying text.
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analytical integrity by rejecting the impulse to mask policy decisions in the garb
of pseudoscience. This, in turn, occurs when jurists tether their opinions to
doctrinal purpose468 and to functional hydrologic connections.469 Further, judges
can recognize groundwater as not only the target of regulation, but also the
subject of protection. In the context of federal reserved water rights, the Supreme
Court held in Cappaert v. United States that the federal government could enjoin
water uses that harmed its reserved rights, whether the interference came from
surface diversions or from groundwater pumping.470 Building on that holding,
the Ninth Circuit held in Agua Caliente that “[i]f the United States can protect
against groundwater diversions, it follows that it can protect the groundwater
itself.”471 The law could benefit from a similar synthesis under the CWA. In that
context, courts have moved toward an acceptance that the statute can protect
against groundwater pollution that threatens navigable waters, at least in some
contexts.472 But with respect to whether the statute protects groundwater itself,
the law has fluctuated wildly in tandem with the changing of presidential
administrations.473
3. Analysis Freed of Fifth Amendment Distractions
The regulatory takings doctrine has been a distraction from careful water
management. Not infrequently and often with little analysis, courts justify a
failure to regulate groundwater with unsupported fears that such regulation
would violate the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against uncompensated
takings.474 As far back as 1985, the Supreme Court recognized such fears as
distractions. In Riverside Bayview Homes, it upheld the regulation of fill
deposited into wetlands, regardless of whether those wetlands were fed by
surface water or by groundwater.475 Sweeping away vague takings concerns, the
468
See supra note 247 and accompanying text (rejecting Mississippi’s attempt to circumvent the purposes
of equitable apportionment by claiming ownership of the groundwater beneath its territory). See generally
Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1127
(2018) (observing “courts often invoke policy experimentation as a rationale for limiting federal authority” and
arguing that rationale is “often misguided”).
469
See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text (describing Colorado’s statutory scheme calibrating
the extent of groundwater use regulation with a degree of connectivity to surface water sources).
470
See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
471
See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text (referencing Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians
v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added)).
472
See supra note 336 and accompanying text (discussing Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462
(2020)).
473
See supra Part II.D.2.a (discussing the evolution of jurisdictional regulatory definition of “waters of
the United States”).
474
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
475
See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
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Court concluded that the challenged regulation represented a permissible
interpretation of the Clean Water Act: “Purged of its spurious constitutional
overtones,” the question of the validity of the regulation at issue “is an easy
one.”476 According to one empirical study of over fifty groundwater cases
alleging uncompensated Fifth Amendment takings, courts widely declare
groundwater use rights as “constitutional property” that is potentially protected
by the takings doctrine.477 But despite this judicial willingness to propertize
groundwater in theory, landowners rarely succeed in proving their takings
claims under the facts of individual cases.478

CONCLUSION
Groundwater exceptionalism began, perhaps innocently enough, at a time
when both hydrologic understanding and groundwater usage were minimal. But
it became a surprisingly sticky catechism that persisted long after its proponents
understood that groundwater was not a mysterious substance with no
relationship to its surficial counterpart. Exceptionalism provided a useful,
pseudoscientific cover for a variety of interests, including those of well pumpers
who wanted to jump ahead in the priority line decades after the most durable
surface rights had been fully allocated; state groundwater users who feared
curtailment to provide water for federal purposes on tribal and federal lands;
states that turned a blind eye to their citizens’ groundwater use that potentially
exceeded the state’s allocated share of interstate rivers; landowners who wanted
to fill in wetlands on their property for agriculture and development; and
polluters who wanted to discharge their wastes with minimal federal oversight.
Part subterfuge, part wishful thinking, exceptionalism proved a useful tool for
these powerful interests and rooted expectations.
But ignoring hydrologic reality is not costless. Over time, it has become
apparent that groundwater is not an inexhaustible resource: every drop of
groundwater pumped by one water user means there will be potentially one drop
less available to others or to sustain the natural environment. Aligning law with
physical reality will undoubtedly raise new and perplexing questions about who
should have the right to use limited water resources and the degree to which
particular water uses and polluting activities should be regulated. It will also
afford new opportunities for fresh thinking about our water use in the face of

476

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129 (1985).
Owen, supra note 31, at 277, 280–85.
478
Id. (noting that although groundwater may be generally recognized as constitutional property,
landowners and groundwater users rarely win under the facts of each individual case).
477
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climate change and inadequate supplies. Painful or not, the reckoning is long
overdue, and the law must move beyond exceptionalism to embrace the reality
of the water cycle.

